On Justification, Idealization, and Discursive Purchase

Besch, Thomas M.

doi:10.1007/s11406-018-0007-5

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Beyond ideal types, it is not always straightforward whether a given conception of public justification instantiates, or leans toward, ideal or actualist justification. This is so not least because all acceptability-based justification hypotheticalizes, however minimally, and hence idealizes in one sense of the word (Enoch 2015;Besch 2019). For it must qualify the discursive input that it counts as authoritative, or as contributing to justification.…”

Section: Ijmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism

Besch

2020

Philosophia

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Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls's view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal or idealizing and conception-applying). It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in public justification.

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Section: Ijmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism

Besch

2020

Philosophia

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“…For Forst, RGA requires that agents be accorded a strong form of discursive standing—or a “high‐purchase” form of discursive respect (Besch 2014, 2019a, 2019b). Justification practice that complies with RGA construes equal acceptability by actual agents as justifying.…”

Section: Reciprocity Of Reasons?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: A Critique

Besch¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, that is, reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of reasonableness that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive, and a duty of justification to meet RGA is not agent transparent and not adoptable. This result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires downgrading RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have. 1 Forst draws on many sources, but two early influences continue to resonate in his work. These are Habermas's discourse ethics and Rawls's political liberalism (see Forst 1994, chap. 4, and Forst 2010). Forst aims to combine a Kantian form of moral constructivism with a Rawls-type political constructivism (although he more recently moves to a strong Kantian reading of Rawls's political liberalism; see Forst 2017b). For Forst, a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability is at the heart of both kinds of constructivism.

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“…It is not necessarily irrational to refuse increases of our normative influence in justification if we take it, for example, that valuable degrees of such influence cannot exceed a certain level. 21 See Besch (2014); Besch (2018b). conceptions of what is good, right, or true.…”

Section: Discursive Standingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This may be one reason why conceptions of public justification that attach importance to the participation value of public justification tend to idealize less, rather than more. See Besch (2018b).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%