On Evaluating Delegated Digital Signing of Broadcasting Messages in 5G

Gao, Hui; Zhang, Yiming; Wan, Tao; Jia, Zhang; Duan, Haixin

doi:10.1109/globecom46510.2021.9685173

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Few studies (such as [12,13]) proposed various mechanisms to counteract the FBS. However, in this paper, we focus on those proposed by 3GPP: PKC-, IBC-, and group key-based schemes [7].…”

Section: Existing Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Enhanced Group Key-Based Security Protocol to Protect 5G SON Against FBS

Park¹,

Kim²,

Duguma³

et al. 2023

Computer Systems Science and Engineering

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Network operators are attempting many innovations and changes in 5G using self-organizing networks (SON). The SON operates on the measurement reports (MR), which are obtained from user equipment (UE) and secured against malware and userspace programs. However, the synchronization signal block that the UE relies on to measure the wireless environment configured by a base station is not authenticated. As a result, the UE will likely gauge the wrong wireless environment configured by a false base station (FBS) and transmit the corresponding MR to the serving base station, which poisons the data used for 5G SONs. Therefore, the serving base stations must verify the authenticity of the MR. The 3GPP has advocated numerous solutions for this issue, including the use of public key certificates, identity-based keys, and group keys. Although the solution leveraging group keys have better efficiency and practicality than the other two, they are vulnerable to security threats caused by key leaks via insiders or malicious UE. In this paper, we analyze these security issues and propose an improved group key protocol that uses a new network function, called a broadcast message authentication network function (BMANF), which validates broadcasted messages on behalf of the UE. The protocol operates in two phases: initial and verification. During the initial phase, the 5G core network distributes a shared secret key to the BMANF and UE, allowing the latter to request an authentication ticket from the former. During the verification phase, the UE requests the BMANF to validate the broadcasted messages received from base stations using the ticket and its corresponding shared key. For evaluation, we formally verified the proposed protocol, which was then compared with alternative methods in terms of computing cost. As a result, the proposed protocol fulfills the security requirements and shows a lower overhead than the alternatives.

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“…Few studies (such as [12,13]) proposed various mechanisms to counteract the FBS. However, in this paper, we focus on those proposed by 3GPP: PKC-, IBC-, and group key-based schemes [7].…”

Section: Existing Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This section presents the performance and security comparison results of the proposed protocol against the PKC-, IBC-, group key-based, and DSnF schemes [12]. Tab.…”

Section: Comparative Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

An Enhanced Group Key-Based Security Protocol to Protect 5G SON Against FBS

Park¹,

Kim²,

Duguma³

et al. 2023

Computer Systems Science and Engineering

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“…Solutions in using 5G and other networks (e.g., Wi-Fi). Bhuyan et al, 2021;Ksentini and Frangoudis, 2020;Gonzalez et al, 2020;Liyanage et al, 2018;Wang and Yan, 2015;Tahir et al, 2020;Azzaoui et al, 2020;Nieto et al, 2017Nieto et al, , 2018Zhang and Lin, 2017;Compagno et al, 2017;Dik and Berger, 2021;Benzaid and Taleb, 2020;Zhao et al, 2021a;Bitsikas and Pöpper, 2021;Chaudhary et al, 2020;Gao et al, 2021;Sood et al, 2021;Cao et al, 2020;Ding et al, 2022b;Wu et al, 2018;Shi and Sagduyu, 2021;Sullivan et al, 2021;Mei et al, 2018;Gebremariam et al, 2021;Ginzboorg and Niemi, 2016;Rotinsulu and Fitri Sari, 2018;Vassilakis et al, 2017;Ar-joune and Faruque, 2020]. An adversary can maliciously (1) use legitimate orchestrator access to manipulate the configuration and run a compromised network function, (2) take advantage of malicious insiders attacks, (3) perform unauthorized access (e.g., to confidential data [Isaksson and Norrman, 2020] and to RFID tags [Rahimi et al, 2018]), (4) tampering, (5) perform resource exhaustion, (6) turn services unavailable, ( 7) analyze or modify traffic, (8) perform data leakage (e.g., capturing valuable personal information [Bordel et al, 2021;Annessi et al, 2018;Vreman and Maggio, 2019]), (…”

Section: Item Description Item Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Systematic Literature Mapping on the Security of 5G and Vertical Applications

Sobrinho,

Santos,

Silva

et al. 2023

Preprint

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The deployment of 5G infrastructure is one of the main vectors for new application scenarios since it enables enhanced data bandwidth, low latency, and comprehensive signal coverage. As a result, this communication system supports various vertical applications such as the Industrial Internet of Things, smart health, smart cities, smart grids, and transportation systems. However, these applications bring new challenges to 5G networks due to specific requirements for such scenarios. Furthermore, as software-based technologies, including network slicing, software-defined networks, network function virtualization, and multi-access edge computing are a fundamental part of the 5G architecture, the network can expose these applications to new security and privacy concerns. This study summarizes the existing literature on 5G vertical applications security. We highlight vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and solutions for 5G vertical applications. We conducted a Systematic Literature Mapping (SLM) to discuss security and privacy challenges regarding the 5G vertical applications. The SLM answered the following research question: what is the state-of-the-art regarding security in 5G networks and vertical applications? We reviewed 389 papers from 2,349 produced by searching with a curated search query and discussed vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and solutions for 5G vertical applications. Smart cities, Industry 4.0, smart transportation, public services, smart grids, and smart health are vertical applications with relevant security concerns. We observed the need for more research since the 5G and vertical applications continuously evolve. This review also uncovers research gaps and future research directions.

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