On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios

Crane, Brian R.; Kahn, Herman

doi:10.2307/40199684

Cited by 11 publications

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“…• T > R > S > P : The Chicken game (Rapoport & Chammah, 1966;Kahn, 2017) is an example of this class. For this game, Cooperate and Chicken are synonymous, and Defect and Tough are synonymous.…”

Section: Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Fatima,

Jennings,

Wooldridge

2024

jair

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Social dilemmas are situations of inter-dependent decision making in which individual rationality can lead to outcomes with poor social qualities. The ubiquity of social dilemmas in social, biological, and computational systems has generated substantial research across these diverse disciplines into the study of mechanisms for avoiding deficient outcomes by promoting and maintaining mutual cooperation. Much of this research is focused on studying how individuals faced with a dilemma can learn to cooperate by adapting their behaviours according to their past experience. In particular, three types of learning approaches have been studied: evolutionary game-theoretic learning, reinforcement learning, and best-response learning. This article is a comprehensive integrated survey of these learning approaches in the context of dilemma games. We formally introduce dilemma games and their inherent challenges. We then outline the three learning approaches and, for each approach, provide a survey of the solutions proposed for dilemma resolution. Finally, we provide a comparative summary and discuss directions in which further research is needed.

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Section: Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Fatima,

Jennings,

Wooldridge

2024

jair

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“…Indeed, helpful theoretical work on escalation drastically simplifies the dynamics at play to describe a more complicated process. As example, Kahn's (2009Kahn's ( [1965) analysis of escalation focuses on nuclear strategy, tracing a ladder of escalation in which two adversary nations make strategic decisions balancing risks and rewards through an incremental process of intensifying conflict. But stripping a conflict to a dyadic struggle is hardly peculiar to international relations strategies.…”

Section: Explaining and Diffusing Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemmas and Dimensions of Social Movement Escalation¹

Meyer

2023

Sociological Forum

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Social movements must find ways to intensify their efforts to maintain political relevance—and potential influence. But escalation comes with risks in the potential reactions from authorities, supporters, potential supporters, and opponents. I argue that recognizing two elements of escalation can help. First, we need to acknowledge that movements are not unitary actors and that a large movement cannot always stop putative allies from escalating in risky ways. Second, I argue that scholars and activists can do better in making sense of the dynamics of escalation by disaggregating three dimensions of aggression by tactics, claims, and venues, assessing the range of responses to escalation on each of these dimensions. Social movement organizers face continual pressure to find ways to escalate, but responses from authorities and allies can provide a brake on escalation. I illustrate my arguments with reference to contemporary movements of the left and right in the United States and conclude by discussing the importance (and danger) of certain government responses.

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“…Other classical deterrence theorists focus on the idea that mutual assured destruction makes nuclear war irrational and assume that deterrence is best explained by the game of Chicken (e.g. Kahn, 1961Kahn, , 1962Kahn, , 1965Schelling, 1960Schelling, , 1966. However, Chicken is problematic because it is simply a simultaneous-move game, but deterrence involves the threat of retaliation, which cannot be modeled with simultaneous moves.…”

Section: Accidental War As a Theoretical Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The problem with accidental war

Quackenbush

2023

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Many theories of international conflict are based on the premise that war can occur by accident. The basic idea of accidental war is that crisis situations can spiral out of control, leading to the outbreak of a war despite no one having decided to go to war. Although World War I is often claimed to be the prime example of such an accidental war, modern research suggests that it began as a result of deliberate choices, not by accident. Nonetheless, accidental war continues to be used as an important building block in many theories, including theories of deterrence, bargaining, and the spiral model. In this article, I examine the validity of the assumption that wars can begin by accident, as well as the implications that the lack of accidental wars has for international relations theory.

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On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Dilemmas and Dimensions of Social Movement Escalation¹

The problem with accidental war

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On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey

Dilemmas and Dimensions of Social Movement Escalation1

The problem with accidental war

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Dilemmas and Dimensions of Social Movement Escalation¹