On Epistemic Responsibility While Remembering the Past: The Case of Individual and Historical Memories

Trakas, Marina

doi:10.7202/1071139ar

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…It has been suggested that individuals can adopt a range of viewpoints, both internal and external, visual and non-visual, that can blend or integrate in different ways when recalling the past ( McCarroll and Sutton, 2017 ; McCarroll, 2018 ). In fact, incorporating multiple affective and evaluative perspectives, including those of others involved in the past event, may provide the most comprehensive understanding of the past experience ( Habermas, 2019 ; Trakas, 2019b ). Further empirical research is nevertheless necessary to fully explore these possibilities.…”

Section: The Traveler and The Past Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Trakas

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.

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Section: The Traveler and The Past Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Trakas

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…This effect occurs, for example, when eyewitnesses to a crime form false beliefs about an event that they have witnessed because their recollection of the event is updated to reflect false information provided to them by others (e.g other eyewitnesses, suggestive police questioning) after the event (Loftus 2005). Reconsolidation provides the opportunity for false information to influence how an event is remembered but it can also bring epistemic benefits, allowing people to form more accurate representations of the past if the information that updates the memory is accurate and the initial memory is partial, blurred, or includes elements of inaccuracy (Puddifoot and Bortolotti 2019;Trakas, 2019). However, traumatic memories seem not to be as malleable as (at least some) other memories (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004).…”

Section: The Epistemic Harms Of Fear Generalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Agency and the Generalisation of Fear

Puddifoot¹,

Trakas²

2022

Preprint

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Fear generalisation is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when fear that is elicited in response to a frightening stimulus spreads to similar or related stimuli. The practical harms of fear generalisation are well-documented, but little or no attention has been given so far to its epistemic harms. This paper fills this gap in the literature. It shows how the psychological phenomenon substantially curbs the epistemic agency of those who experience it, limiting their ability to respond to evidence, and substantially limiting their epistemic horizons. It is argued that when these epistemic harms are caused by wrongful actions and decisions of individuals or institutions, because the fear is elicited in response to a traumatic experience inflicted by them, the harms should be considered epistemic wrongs. The epistemic wrongs are closely akin to agential epistemic injustice, a variety of distributive epistemic injustice, and sometimes also involve epistemic exclusion. The paper thereby identifies a previously underexplored psychological mechanism that can be a vehicle through which both individuals and institutions can epistemically wrong others. The argument has implications for how both epistemic wrongs and epistemic injustice should be conceived, suggesting that both can occur without primarily being caused by epistemic flaws or errors, or a bad epistemic character. Finally, it highlights the advantage of taking a victim-centred approach to understanding epistemic harm.

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“…Por último, otro aspecto totalmente omitido es la perspectiva de segunda persona (Pérez y Gomila, en prensa), es decir, la perspectiva afectiva de otro partícipe del evento recordado. La perspectiva afectiva de un evento pasado puede ser construida en algunos casos de manera dialógica, a través de la interacción real entre los involucrados en el evento recordado (Harris et al, 2011), como por ejemplo cuando una pareja recuerda un pasado común (Trakas, 2019). Pero también la perspectiva de segunda persona puede ser internalizada por el sujeto, el cual, en el proceso de (re)evaluación del evento recordado, puede alternar entre su propia perspectiva y la perspectiva imaginada o recordada del otro involucrado en el evento.…”

Section: Marco General De Análisis De Los Recuerdos Personales Como Recuerdos Afectivosunclassified

Dimensiones de análisis de los recuerdos personales como recuerdos afectivos

Trakas

2021

RevPsi

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La investigación reciente en psicología cognitiva sobre la memoria emocional ha estudiado las distintas formas en que las emociones afectan a la memoria, sin profundizar no obstante en la comprensión de la manera en que los aspectos emocionales, afectivos y mnemónicos se encuentran estrechamente entrelazados en el contenido mismo de un acto de reminiscencia. En este artículo propongo un marco conceptual de análisis que nos permite entender los recuerdos personales como recuerdos esencialmente afectivos, y que se articula en torno a dos variables continuas e independientes: por un lado, la intencionalidad del recuerdo, es decir, el objeto hacia el cual el recuerdo está dirigido, que puede ser descriptiva o evaluativa; por el otro, la perspectiva afectiva del recuerdo, que puede fluctuar desde la perspectiva de primera persona hasta la perspectiva de tercera persona. Las dos dimensiones son analizadas en profundidad y las limitaciones de este marco y las futuras líneas de investigación son igualmente presentadas.

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On Epistemic Responsibility While Remembering the Past: The Case of Individual and Historical Memories

Cited by 5 publications

References 49 publications

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Epistemic Agency and the Generalisation of Fear

Dimensiones de análisis de los recuerdos personales como recuerdos afectivos

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