On Doubt

In the Space of Reasonable Doubt

“…Jane Friedman's (2017, forthcoming) works linking inquiry with suspension of judgement notably put an emphasis on the importance of those epistemic states and actions that are generally ignored by belief-centred approaches. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, while the present paper was under review, two papers on doubt have appeared (Lee 2018;Moon 2018). The conceptions of doubt that they defend are different from ours, but the issues they address are mostly orthogonal to the main focus of the present paper, which places discussion of their views beyond its scope.…”

Not Without a Doubt

“…A doubt can be dispositional when it "…isn't a constant irritation or a constant impetus to inquiry…" and "Only when the content [of one's doubt] comes to mind [occurently] does the subject experience discomfort and a desire to make up his [or her] mind." Lee (2018).…”

“…In an earlier work, I showed how it was impossible for me, at least, to defend the assertion that this epistemic gap exists. 14 Following this, I wrote a short paper in which I suggested that Hume's argument for the Problem of Induction may undercut itself. 15 In both of these cases, I took a sceptical argument, assumed that it was true for the sake of argument, and then showed how by its own lights, it fails to go through.…”

Is Pyrrhonian Suspension Incompatible with Doubt?

“…In this section, I will examine the notion of doubt by partially drawing on the analyses offered by Thagard (2004), Howard-Snyder (2013, Lee (2018), andMoon (2018). I will combine some of the results of those analyses because my sole aim is to provide a terminological and conceptual framework in reference to which we may both understand the view that the Pyrrhonist is not a doubter and assess its correctness.…”