On defense as opposed to theodicy

Tierno, Joel Thomas

doi:10.1007/s11153-006-8326-z

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…As Tierno rightly asserts, presenting a theodicy is "to endeavor a rationally convincing explanation of evil, or a particular evil," in this case stealing. 50 But such defense cannot be substantiated except within the remit of the problem of evil, a problem that most Yorubá believe does not arise in their theology. 51 Another argument Ogúngbemí has put forward to deny the existence of Olódumare borders on the existence and nature of witches among the Yorubá.…”

Section: The Philosophical Olódumarementioning

confidence: 99%

Olódumare and Esu in Yorubá Religious Thought

Igboin

2021

YSR

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Theological and philosophical debates on deities do not end easily; rather they open new vistas of understanding and further argumentation. In a previous work, I argued that there are two pairs of Olódumare and Es̩u in contemporary Yorubá religious thought and praxis. This conclusion was to navigate the extreme position that Olódumare and the Christian God have nothing in common. Although Segun Ogungbemi recently maintained the strict theological and moral differences between Olódumare and God using existential lens, he has not addressed the practical reality instantiated by the contemporary Yorubá diverse worshipers. Danoye Ogúntó̩lá-Láguda’s position on Olódumare and Es̩u is also slightly different from Ogúngbemí’s, although the former maintains a more practical posture. From their arguments I propose, in addition to my earlier two-pair argument that contemporary Yorubá may have four pairs of Olódumare and Esu: the first pair is autochtho ̩ - nous to the Yorubá, the second is Christian, the third Islamic, and the fourth, philosophical.

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Section: The Philosophical Olódumarementioning

confidence: 99%

Olódumare and Esu in Yorubá Religious Thought

Igboin

2021

YSR

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“…Em outras palavras, apenas no projeto de teodiceia é que há chances de o teísta vindicar plenamente a justiça de Deus face à existência do mal (Walls, 1991;Wilks, 2004;Tierno, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

O mal e as razões de Deus:o projeto de teodiceia e suas condições de adequação

Silvestre

2012

Filosofia Unisinos

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ResumoNosso objetivo nesse artigo é contribuir para o projeto de metateodiceia, entendido aqui como a elucidação do conceito de teodiceia através da análise de suas condições de adequação. No nosso caso, tal análise se dará dentro de um framework incluindo uma visão taxonômica de tais condições que permita tanto sua descrição satisfatória bem como uma avaliação natural de seu papel e importância, e relações intralógicas existentes entre elas. O resultado dessa análise será usado na introdução de definições minimamente precisas das noções de teodiceia, teodiceia satisfatória, teodiceia plausível, teodiceia ideal, entre outras.Palavras-chave: filosofia analítica da religião, problema do mal, metateodiceia, condições de adequação. AbstractOur purpose in this paper is to contribute to the project of meta-theodicy, understood here as the elucidation of the concept of theodicy through the analysis of its adequacy conditions. In our case, the analysis shall be made inside a framework including a taxonomical view of the theodical adequacy conditions which allows for a rigorously acceptable description of them as well as for a natural appraisal of their role and importance, and of the intra-logical relations holding between them. The result of the such analysis shall be used to introduce definitions minimally precise of the notions of theodicy, satisfactory theodicy, plausible theodicy, ideal theodicy, and the like.

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The Character Development Defense to the Argument from Evil Is Logically Inconsistent

Firestone¹

2018

OJPP

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The Argument from Evil is usually considered the strongest argument against the belief in the Judeo-Christian conception of a perfect God. It states that a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent God would not allow the degree of evil which exists in the world. This paper describes why the theist's strongest response to this argument, widely known as the Soul-Making Theodicy and which this paper calls the Character Development Defense, rests on a logical contradiction. The argument proffered here reformulates an earlier argument made by B.C. Johnson which has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature. Specifically, the Character Development Defense asks humans to develop their character and thereby to take moral actions which benefit others, including mankind as a whole, but at the same time states that we need all the suffering in the world in order to give us ample opportunities for character development. If we follow the logic of this defense to its conclusion, then we should both help others to improve the world, but also not help them because that takes away the opportunities people need to develop their characters. This paper also reviews the literature in this area so it can be seen how the current argument takes a quite different approach. Lastly, the paper addresses five possible objections, and then replies to each objection.

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On defense as opposed to theodicy

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Olódumare and Esu in Yorubá Religious Thought

Olódumare and Esu in Yorubá Religious Thought

O mal e as razões de Deus:o projeto de teodiceia e suas condições de adequação

The Character Development Defense to the Argument from Evil Is Logically Inconsistent

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