On crony capitalism

Mukherjee, Conan

doi:10.1007/s40622-019-00202-z

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Alternatively, government officials and politicians in uncertain environments will often utilize, and exploit, government‐sponsored financial institutions to advance their own political ambitions (Dinc, 2005). These interfaces can form a nexus of crony capitalism that will likely play a key role in ‘hampering competitive market practices’ (Mukherjee, 2019: 35) as well as the provisioning of preferential allocation of financial resources via contractual arrangements (Diwan and Schiffbauer, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…government‐sponsored financial institutions) to advance their own political ambitions (Dinc, 2005; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). This form of crony capitalism can play a key role in ‘hampering competitive market practices’ (Mukherjee, 2019: 35) as well as the provisioning of preferential allocation of financial resources via contractual arrangements (Diwan and Schiffbauer, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Seeds of Corruption? The Contingent Role of Ties to Politicians and Foreign Subsidiary Relations with Government‐Sponsored Financial Institutions

White

Chintakananda

Rajwani

2022

British J of Management

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In drawing from transaction cost economics and social network theories, this study examines the influence of corruption as a determinant of foreign subsidiary formal contracting practices with government-sponsored financial institutions. We hypothesize that lower corruption distance (between parent home and host countries) and higher perceived corruption (in host country) are positively related, and mutually reinforcing, when considering a foreign subsidiary's propensity to formally contract with government-sponsored financial institutions. We also suggest that these relationships strengthen with the intensification of political ties to government officials who can offer preferential political services via contractual agreements, changing the nature of market transactions in favour of a foreign subsidiary. We found support for our hypotheses using data from a sample of over 350 subsidiaries located in the Philippines and Thailand.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%