On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson

Abstract

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio-enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bioenhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This paper aims to show that the proposal Savulescu & Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu's & Persson's normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu's & Persson's proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions.

Moral Enhancement Should Target Self-Interest and Cognitive Capacity

“…Further, I argue that this can be synergetically supplemented with cognitive enhancement. My argument is thus partially in line with both Earp et al [ 3 ], who argue that in certain cases, diminishing a capacity can actually be an enhancement, and with authors like Harris [ 4 ], Carter & Gordon [ 5 ] and Earp et al [ 6 ], who in the context of moral enhancement argue in favor of second-order moral capacities such as reasoning.…”

“…First of all, John Harris [ 4 ] famously argues, contra Persson & Savulescu, that stupidity is at least as dangerous as malice, and that cognitive enhancement would therefore on the balance decrease the risk of Ultimate Harm. Further, Carter & Gordon [ 5 ] argue that moral enhancement probably must involve some form of cognitive enhancement, since moral reasoning is itself a form of reasoning. 11 Finally, Earp et al [ 6 ] touch on a similar argument when they propose second-order, rather than first-order, moral capacities to be a superior target for moral enhancement.…”

Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement

“…For recent criticism to this general line of argument, see Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Bostrom (2005). 62 See, however, Carter and Gordon (2015) for a recent critique of Savulescu and Persson's argument. 63 I am grateful to Mark Alfano, Jennifer Corns, Emma C. Gordon, Orestis Palermos, Richard Heersmink, Fiona Macpherson, Glen Pettigrove, Duncan Pritchard and Jesús Vega Encabo for helpful discussion.…”

The ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement: a review of reasons

“…Harris, however, argues that we should instead embrace cognitive enhancements, as they are our best prospect of self-defense against disaster ([ 17 ]: 110). Adam Carter and Emma Gordon argue that because cognitive and moral enhancements are principally interconnected, we should consider potential enhancements “ outwith any essential reference to a moral/cognitive conceptual dichotomy” ([ 37 ]: 8).…”