Omnipotence, feminism and God

Abstract

But for feminism, the further monarchical monotheism rationalises the object of its experiences, the more obviously susceptible it becomes to deconstruction as an anthropomorphic projection which divinises male political power. 1Even superficial acquaintance with feminists on God reveals that there is little common ground in premises or methods of argument between the philosophical basis of the traditional concept of God and the feminist counter blast to it. Thus it is hard a priori to see how any attempt to weigh one against the other can make any progress. Nonetheless, it may well be worth the attempt to do so, in the spirit of trying to keep open some channels of communication between analytic discussions of the concept of God and the flood of feminist writing in philosophy and theology.My focus is on the attribute of omnipotence and this for two reasons. One is that it has been crucial in the feminist critique, playing a key role in confirming -for feminists -that the concept of God in philosophy of religion is not politically innocent but rather a projection of masculine attributes and goals onto a divine being. Further, it might be supposed that by looking at the critique of one attribute discussion could be narrowed down to a range of issues manageable in a single paper. This latter reason entails problems, since it is evident that the rejection of omnipotence in God as obviously a male projection is part and parcel of a wider case and may stand or fall with that case. However, a reading of authors such as Reuther, Hampson and Daly would suggest that the alleged errors in the doctrine of omnipotence are reasons for thinking that the entire, traditional concept of God has to go and thus, in turn, that the errors of omnipotence are independently discussible to some degree.However, the notion that there is an independently weighable feminist case against the doctrine of divine omnipotence faces two further difficulties. They both stem from what appears to be the curious indirection of the feminist critique. This indirection is twofold.

Is There a Distinctively Feminist Philosophy of Religion?

“…Harriet Harris objects that Jantzen is more concerned with the way in which particular beliefs perpetuate or alleviate suffering, than with asking whether reasoning is sound or a belief is true (75; cf. Peter Byrne 146). Since the latter have, historically, been the concerns of philosophy, Harris says that she finds Jantzen’s view difficult to recognise as philosophy (75).…”