Oligopoly “A la cournot” in a general equilibrium analysis

Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold; Vial, Jean–Philippe

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90129-9

Cited by 279 publications

(166 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

165

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Regarding production strategies, there is room for more generality than indicated above. Partial equilibrium (10) could comeà la Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, Arrow-Debreu (1954), Gabszewicz-Vial (1972), or Shapley-Shubik (1977). It imports that the production component of equilibrium be stable.…”

Section: Links To Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reaching Cournot-Walras Equilibrium

Flåm

Gramstad

2017

ESAIM: ProcS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Links To Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reaching Cournot-Walras Equilibrium

Flåm

Gramstad

2017

ESAIM: ProcS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For any larger number of suppliers, say n and water users, say m, the n suppliers compete on some markets but not necessarily all m. Our model relates to the literature on Cournot-Walras competition (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972), in the sense that water extracting agents maximize their profits by choosing water extraction levels and markets where to sell it, taking into account the (indirect) price effects and extractions by their competing water suppliers. Our paper, however, provides additional structure to the Cournot-Walras model because of the sequential structure of the water resources (mimicking the direction of river flow), the infrastructure to serve markets, and money and water differentiated across m locations as m + 1 goods, in combination with the quasi-linear utility functions of a user's own water consumption and money.…”

Section: Puts Itmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Multi-market quantity competition can be regarded as a special case of the CournotWalras model in Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). In this model, producers decide on output before consumers purchase goods.…”

Section: Market-clearing Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market power in water markets

Ansink

Houba

2012

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We model water markets with market power as multi-market Cournot competition with a river structure. Suppliers are connected through the water balances, which imposes resource constraints, and are connected to heterogeneous water users via a water delivery infrastructure. Our model captures a wide range of specific water market structures. We establish conditions for existence of an equilibrium with market power. Each supplier only serves users with maximal marginal revenues. The monopoly case is similar to the standard one, but three other specific water market structures illustrate that standard intuition has to be revisited. Multiple equilibria may arise for common resources. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

“…21 Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) is a key reference on the numéraire problem in oligopolistic models in general equilibrium. 22 Real variables are homogeneous of degree zero in factor rewards, the inverse of the marginal utility of national income, and the trade policy instrument.…”

Section: Supply Side and Partial Equilibrium In Home-market Sub-gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Trade Policy in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium

Colacicco

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a two-country general oligopolistic equilibrium model, I study how crosssector strategic trade policy affects wages, countrywide profits, and welfare. Firms face resource constraints and wages are simultaneously determined. Relative to free trade, cross-sector protectionism generates a reduction in the foreign wage without affecting the domestic wage. Domestic countrywide profits benefit from small import tariffs, whereas the foreign counterpart is hit, but when sectors share the same technology. Domestic welfare is unambiguously penalized. Hence, the general-equilibrium cross-sector perspective goes against the textbook version theory of the optimal tariff in partial equilibrium. Rationalization of these effects suggests a politicaleconomy view on tariff formation in general equilibrium. JEL:D43 AbstractIn a two-country general oligopolistic equilibrium model, I study how cross-sector strategic trade policy affects wages, countrywide profits, and welfare. Firms face resource constraints and wages are simultaneously determined. Relative to free trade, cross-sector protectionism generates a reduction in the foreign wage without affecting the domestic wage. Domestic countrywide profits benefit from small import tariffs, whereas the foreign counterpart is hit, but when sectors share the same technology. Domestic welfare is unambiguously penalized. Hence, the general-equilibrium cross-sector perspective goes against the textbook version theory of the optimal tariff in partial equilibrium. Rationalization of these effects suggests a political-economy view on tariff formation in general equilibrium.

show abstract

Oligopoly “A la cournot” in a general equilibrium analysis

Cited by 279 publications

References 3 publications

Reaching Cournot-Walras Equilibrium

Reaching Cournot-Walras Equilibrium

Market power in water markets

Strategic Trade Policy in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About