Oligarchy

Winters, Jeffrey A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511793806

Cited by 367 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…The continued challenge for committed democrats is to be mindful that democratic institutions act on behalf of an elite interest and, ipso facto, subvert democratic egalitarian self-determining groups. Hence, providing resistance to the oligarchic nature of democratic institutions in the USA and other democracies through anarchic justice is vital to democracy and greater democratic participation (Winters, 2011). Anarchic resistance to democratic institutions is in essence, paradoxically, the life blood of democracy.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some democratic theorists since Michels, such as Thomas Dye and Jeffrey Winters, have nevertheless questioned whether the oligarchic tendencies Michels described in Political Parties, can be replicated, more or less, in other democratic settings (Dye, 2001;Winters, 2011). Giovanni Sartori argued that Michels may very well have formulated an 'iron law of bureaucracy,' mistaking 'democracy in structures, not in interactions,' and thus overlooking the real difference between democracies and non-democracies (Sartori, 1987).…”

Section: Historical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oligarchy, Anarchy, and Social Justice

Martin

2015

Contemporary Justice Review

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This article attempts to identify the problems associated with democratic organizations, and institutions. The issue of democratic, self-governing organizations, and institutions being transformed into oligarchies is addressed. Thus, the question of democratic rule being undermined by elites and their attempts to co-opt democratic organizations, specifically government, is assessed. In order to mitigate elite interests within organizations, anarchist social justice is considered (paradoxically) as a means to revitalize and transform democratic government.All modern revolutions have ended in a reinforcement of the state.Albert CamusDemocratic structures, that is, those organizations and institutions which attempt to be self-governing, majoritarian institutions, invariably become oligarchies by virtue of the fact that elite interests within these structures are prioritized over and above the needs of the majority members. In developing this thesis further, Robert Michels argued, 'It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy' (Michels, 1962, p. 365). Self-ruling, liberal democratic organizations, and institutions -whether liberal democracies, social democracies, or democratic socialist systems -invariably morph into oligarchic structures. Thus, concerns arise as to (1) How and why major organizations and institutions are constructed into rigid oligarchies? (2) What interests seem to dominate and control organizations? (3) What particular forces in private and public organizations obstruct democratic rule and self-determination? and (4) How are organizations and institutions linked to each other and their similar interests? If, then, it can be demonstrated that organizations, institutions, and governments, in essence form oligarchies and undermine democratic purposes, and that democratic reforms appear to be futile in remediating these oligarchies, then other alternatives to revitalize and renew democratic institutions, that is, if democratic majoritarian self-rule remains a priority for people. This is timely since there are those who argue that democratic principles can be violated in order to facilitate the *

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Historical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oligarchy, Anarchy, and Social Justice

Martin

2015

Contemporary Justice Review

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“…Political parties which sat on the DPR tend to be 6 A number of scholars have grounded their research on the role of political oligarchies in order to explain the dynamics of post-Reformasi Indonesian politics. Notable scholarships produced by this school of thought include Robison and Hadiz 2004, Hadiz 2010, and Winters 2011. The theoretical insights of the oligarchy school has recently been extended in the analysis of hardline Islamic groups in Indonesia.…”

Section: New State Institutions Established In the Earlymentioning

confidence: 99%

From Civil Islam towards NKRI Bersyariah? Understanding Rising Islamism in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

Sebastian¹,

Arifianto²

2018

Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017)

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Abstract-The successful Defending Islam campaign against former Jakarta governor Basuki TjahajaPurnama is clear evidence that Islamism is rising in post-Reformasi Indonesia, something that is not wellanalyzed in recent scholarships on Indonesian Islam. Influenced strongly by Civil Islam thesis, they have failed to study hardline Islamic movements due to its premises that: 1) the dominant mode of Islamic discourse in Indonesia is the moderate Islam represented by organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and 2) hardline Islamism represents a fringe element to the moderate theological discourses embedded in Indonesian Islam.I argue that rising Islamism in Indonesia is attributed to the following factors: Hardline Islamist groups are able to promote their exclusivist public theologies using the following mechanisms: 1) Appealing for solidarity and common experiences as Indonesian Muslims to persuade more moderate Muslims to join their activities, 2) Using religious propagation (da'wa) institutions such as campus da'wa groups, state companies and bureaucratic institutions, and social media outlets to promote their theological viewpoints to Indonesian Muslims, and 3) Seeking out allies in national and local government in order to have their policy agenda (e.g., restrictions against religious minorities) implemented at both national and local levels. Meanwhile, moderate civil Islamic groups are losing their appeal because these groups (particularly NU and Muhammadiyah) have moved their central focus from religious propagation to social activism and politics.

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“…The first step in this direction was to abolish the dualistic legal structure inherited from the Dutch in favor of the weaker adat side of the structure, which 'made it much easier for Indonesia's military and political elites to gut the legal system of its autonomy and subordinate it to executive power' [ [89]: 153]. Subsequently -first under Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime (1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962)(1963)(1964)(1965)(1966), then to an even greater extent under Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998) -army officers were placed in key government and administration roles, and a massive expansion of military business activities was encouraged.…”

Section: … In Fragmented Marketplacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The historical origins of corruption in the developing world: a comparative analysis of East Asia

Hellmann

2017

Crime Law Soc Change

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A new approach has emerged in the literature on corruption in the developing world that breaks with the assumption that corruption is driven by individualistic self-interest and, instead, conceptualizes corruption as an informal system of norms and practices. While this emerging neo-institutionalist approach has done much to further our understanding of corruption in the developing world, one key question has received relatively little attention: how do we explain differences in the institutionalization of corruption between developing countries? The paper here addresses this question through a systematic comparison of seven developing and newly industrialized countries in East Asia. The argument that emerges through this analysis is that historical sequencing mattered: countries in which the 'political marketplace' had gone through a process of concentration before universal suffrage was introduced are now marked by less harmful types of corruption than countries where mass voting rights where rolled out in a context of fragmented political marketplaces. The paper concludes by demonstrating that this argument can be generalized to the developing world as a whole.Recently, the analysis of corruption in developing countries has undergone a radical revision. Specifically, scholars are increasingly emphasizing that we need to move away from studying corruption as individualistic acts of deviant behavior and instead acknowledge that corruption can become institutionalized as informal rules and routines, thus putting great pressure on individuals to perform according to these norms. [t]he Bbasic norm^of this invisible legal system sanctions the unavoidability of bribes, the rule that recourse to hidden exchange cannot be avoided in return for any Bresource^of value obtainable from the public structure within the corruption network'.

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Oligarchy

Cited by 367 publications

References 0 publications

Oligarchy, Anarchy, and Social Justice

Oligarchy, Anarchy, and Social Justice

From Civil Islam towards NKRI Bersyariah? Understanding Rising Islamism in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

The historical origins of corruption in the developing world: a comparative analysis of East Asia

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