Old wine, new bottles: In search of dialectics

Abstract

More than 5 years before events in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Arab Spring of 2011 brought revolution back to the forefront of political debate, a national-popular revolution with an indigenous face brought the government of Evo Morales and MAS (Movement for Socialism) to power in Bolivia, in December 2005. Yet the Morales government presents the familiar paradox, dear to historians, of change within continuity. It also speaks to the tensions between culture and political economy, both in the world at large and in academic analyses of it. Until recently (mid-2011), Morales and MAS enjoyed a level of popularity and legitimacy not seen in Bolivia since the early years of the MNR (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement), following the Revolution of '52. Regionally, Morales's Bolivia has enjoyed better relations with neighboring Chile, Argentina, and Brazil than any regime since General Bánzer's, during the darkest night of Plan Condor. As it has broken off relations with the US government with minimal negative consequences internationally and demonstrably positive consequences internally (in terms of regime consolidation), the Morales administration has carved out a role for itself as the representative of indigenous voices in the global arena. Therefore it has also taken the lead on issues related to climate change and coca production. Some of the known facts are worth restating in order to grasp the magnitude of the changes in official politics that followed the revolutionary cycle of 2000-2005: elected with 54% of the vote on an 85% turnout in 2005, in 2009, Morales was reelected with 60% of the vote on a turnout of 90%. In 2005, MAS won a bare majority in the Chamber of Deputies (65 out of 130), and 12 of 27 Senate seats, but in 2009, MAS took 25 of 36 Senate seats and 82 of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. After taking 33% in Santa Cruz in 2005, Morales took 41% of votes in the heartland of rightwing reaction in 2009. In the other departments of the rightwing media luna (the ''half moon'' refers to the four easterly departments that shape the

The contours of Gramscian theory in Bolivia: From government rhetoric to radical critique

“…Elites demanding autonomy for the resource‐rich region used the discourses of the Unity Pact instrumentally for their own gain, undermining the position of indigenous groups and subaltern sectors. The political right of the eastern lowlands was able to influence the political rhythms of the Constituent Assembly process between 2006 and 2008 through threats of separatism and sabotage, as were the sucrenses , who used the Constituent Assembly's location in Sucre to try and reclaim the seat of government as the historic and judicial capital (Hylton, , p. 245; Shavelzon, ; Webber, ) . The official version of plurinationalism—compromised through concessions to economically powerful groups in the east—has enabled the continued growth of Bolivia's extractive political economy, bringing some of the tensions underlying the MAS government to the fore.…”

“…It is true that Morales's government assumed more of a reformist than a revolutionary character, failing to break decisively with neoliberal logic . During the Constituent Assembly, MAS demonstrated a reluctance to rely on the social movements that shaped the revolutionary period 2000–2005 and were quick to make backdoor concessions to the old dominant social forces, offering them an opportunity to reconstitute themselves in the face of what could have been an absolute defeat (Hylton, , p. 4). However, if MAS is a counterinsurgent force, then how do we describe the groups behind the 2008 massacre of tens of indigenous activists in Porvenir?…”