Oil and Civil Conflict: Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?

Bodea, Cristina; Higashijima, Masaaki; Singh, Raju

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.09.004

Cited by 47 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) argue that what matters in reducing negative effects on growth is the constitutional arrangement: presidential regimes and proportional electoral systems are more likely to be afflicted by the resource curse. The detrimental effect of natural resources on growth may also be reversed by high human capital endowments (Kurtz and Brooks, 2011), while public spending could mitigate civil conflicts related to oil wealth (Bodea et al, 2016). 5 Caselli and Cunningham (2009) define the underlying mechanisms of these models as decentralised and centralised, respectively.…”

Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

2018

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Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

2018

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“…The vector of control variables includes potential determinants of antigovernment protests gleaned from the existing literature that explains the effect of oil resources (Bodea, Higashijima and Singh 2016, Dreher and Gassebner 2012, Goldstone et al 2010, van Weezel 2016. We avoid the "garbage can" or "kitchen-sink models" approach and limit our control variables (Achen 2005, Schrodt 2014.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oil Price Volatility and Political Unrest: Prudence and Protest in Producer and Consumer Societies, 1980-2013

Vadlamannati

Soysa

2018

SSRN Journal

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Many find that oil wealth produces political conflict. It is also argued that oil makes countries susceptible to the "resource curse" because rulers more easily buy off opposition and stave off economic reforms. We explore this issue by examining whether oil price volatility affects political unrest in oil-producing and oil import dependent states. We argue that in oil-producing countries, low prices generate antigovernment protest conditional on a state´s access to foreign exchange reserves that accumulate due to political prudence. We also argue that oilimporting countries are affected by high oil prices, but again, conditional on access to foreign exchange reserves, which allow government to ease the pain of austerity. Using panel data covering 165 countries between 1980-2013 (34 years), we find support for the hypotheses. Our results lend support to the view that prudent governance in oil-producer countries that resist political Dutch disease and save for rainy days are more capable of weathering low-price years. These results are in line with others that show that oil producers avoid civil war through higher public spending. The results are robust to alternative data, measurement, sample size, and estimation methods.

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“…Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) argue that what matters in reducing negative effects on growth is the constitutional arrangement: presidential regimes and proportional electoral systems are more likely to be afflicted by the resource curse. The detrimental effect of natural resources on growth may also be reversed by high human capital endowments (Kurtz and Brooks 2011), while public spending might mitigate civil conflicts related to oil wealth (Bodea et al 2016). 5 Caselli and Cunningham (2009) define the underlying mechanisms of these models as decentralized and centralized respectively.…”

Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is there a fiscal resource curse? Resource rents, fiscal capacity, and political institutions in developing economies

Masi¹,

Savoia²,

Sen³

2020

WIDER Working Paper

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States' fiscal capacity plays a pivotal role in developing economies, but it is less clear what its determinants are or what explains cross-country differences. We focus on the impact of natural resources. Standard arguments suggest that natural resources rents may reduce incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. However, political institutions that limit rulers' discretion over the use of resource revenues may mitigate or neutralize this negative effect. We investigate this hypothesis using panel data for 1995 to 2015 for 62 developing countries. The results suggest: (1) point-source resources are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, while diffuse resources are not; (2) developing economies with institutionalized executive constraints can neutralize the negative effect of point-source resources; (3) the effect of resource rents works mainly through institutions that make the tax system accountable and transparent. Thus it is possible to develop both fiscal capacity and the natural resources sector, without any trade-off.

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Oil and Civil Conflict: Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?

Cited by 47 publications

References 73 publications

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

Oil Price Volatility and Political Unrest: Prudence and Protest in Producer and Consumer Societies, 1980-2013

Is there a fiscal resource curse? Resource rents, fiscal capacity, and political institutions in developing economies

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