Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory

Abstract

The article presented is theoretically grounded in the office-seeking approach to the study of coalitions. It takes the most influential theories of portfolio distribution in the executive and legislature (voting weights, proportionality, formateur) and tests it on the data pertaining to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 2010. We follow the distribution of portfolios in the government, in the presidium of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in the presidiums of permanent parliamentary committees. The approach based on voting weights seems best for studying portfolio distribution in the Czech Republic, although it is not entirely satisfactory. In the theoretical discussion of the results, we also point out that the voting weights approach is somewhat less rigorous than others. At the same time, we show that even ostensibly exact approaches to the study of coalitions can lead to arbitrariness on the part of the researcher, as theoretical assumptions about portfolio distribution operate with decimal numbers, whereas in reality one operates with natural numbers.