2022
DOI: 10.1109/access.2022.3217797
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Off-the-Shelf Solutions as Potential Cyber Threats to Industrial Environments and Simple-To-Implement Protection Methodology

Abstract: The paper investigates cyber threats and potential solutions for protecting industrial control systems (ICS). On the cyber threats side, different off-the-shelf offensive solutions, both hardware and software, are analysed and tested. The goal of the paper is to increase cyber threat awareness by showing how such off-the-shelf solutions, well known to IT security experts, can be utilised as (or inspire) attack vectors to gain access to generally unprotected industrial plants. After obtaining an accessing point… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Our threat model assumes an attacker that has gained unauthorized initial access to the industrial communications network. The initial access to the IACS could be gained by compromising IT devices within the OT network (e.g., engineering workstations, printers), implementing a ''rouge'' device within the industrial communication network, replicating via removable media, and compromising the supply chain (e.g., firmware updates, physical devices) [33]. Very importantly, our threat model assumes that Modbus/TCP peers are not compromised and that unauthorized access to the IACS devices is not possible (e.g., through physical protection measures such as locking devices in cabinets).…”
Section: B Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our threat model assumes an attacker that has gained unauthorized initial access to the industrial communications network. The initial access to the IACS could be gained by compromising IT devices within the OT network (e.g., engineering workstations, printers), implementing a ''rouge'' device within the industrial communication network, replicating via removable media, and compromising the supply chain (e.g., firmware updates, physical devices) [33]. Very importantly, our threat model assumes that Modbus/TCP peers are not compromised and that unauthorized access to the IACS devices is not possible (e.g., through physical protection measures such as locking devices in cabinets).…”
Section: B Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The fuzzy model can be developed based on the available data on security incidents, the security systems feature, and the feedback from security personnel. The output of the fuzzy model can provide a quantitative assessment of the security system's effectiveness, which can be used to identify the system's strengths and weaknesses and to optimize the security measures [3].…”
Section: Evaluating Security System Effectiveness Through Fuzzy Model...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Figures 2,3,4 show graphs of membership functions for the linguistic variables "Compliance of measures", "Probability of threat", "Effectiveness of the security system".…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%