Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Recent Keyword Search Schemes over Encrypted Data

Byun, Jin Wook; Rhee, Hyun Suk; Park, Hyun-A; Lee, Dong Hoon

doi:10.1007/11844662_6

Cited by 250 publications

(139 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…However, this paper demonstrates that Jeong et al's SEKR schemes [3] are not secure to off-line keyword guessing attacks [4], which an adversary (insider/outsider) can retrieve information of certain keyword from any captured query message of the scheme. …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…In general, keywords are chosen from much smaller space than passwords and users usually use well-known keywords (low entropy) for search of document [4]. For example, in an e-mail search system which is a major application area of keyword search scheme based on public key encryption, users are interested to search for their e-mails sent by "Supervisor" or "Lover" in the From field or they may concern well-known keywords such as "Urgent", "Exam", and "Hello" in the Title fields.…”

Section: Off-line Keyword Guessing Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Searchable Encryption with Keyword-Recoverability

Yoon

Yoo

2010

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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SUMMARYIn 2009, Jeong et al. proposed a new searchable encryption scheme with keyword-recoverability which is secure even if the adversaries have any useful partial information about the keyword. They also proposed an extension scheme for multi-keywords. However, this paper demonstrates that Jeong et al.'s schemes are vulnerable to off-line keyword guessing attacks, where an adversary (insider/outsider) can retrieve information of certain keyword from any captured query message of the scheme.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Off-line Keyword Guessing Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Searchable Encryption with Keyword-Recoverability

Yoon

Yoo

2010

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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“…By performing this off-line keyword guessing attack, the malicious attacker can obtain relevant information from the encrypted emails, and hence, the keyword. This observation was firstly made by Byun et al [6] who observed that Merriam-Webseter's collegiate dictionary contained only 225,000 keyword definitions. Furthermore, Byun et al also pointed out that Boneh et al's scheme [4] was susceptible to keyword guessing attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Byun et al [6] also left an open problem on how to construct PEKS schemes secure against keyword guessing attacks. This problem was answered by Rhee et al [29] by constructing a new secure SCF-PEKS scheme against keyword guessing attacks in the random oracle model.…”

Section: Two Types Of Attackers In Scf-peksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle

Fang

Susilo

et al. 2013

Information Sciences

191

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. Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle. Information Sciences, 238 221-241.Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle AbstractThe notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given a "trapdoor" (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor. Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion very practical. Following Boneh et al. 's work, there have been subsequent works that have been proposed to enhance this notion. Two important notions include the so-called keyword guessing attack and secure channel free, proposed by Byun et al. and Baek et al., respectively. The former realizes the fact that in practice, the space of the keywords used is very limited, while the latter considers the removal of secure channel between the receiver and the server to make PEKS practical. Unfortunately, the existing construction of PEKS secure against keyword guessing attack is only secure under the random oracle model, which does not reflect its security in the real world. Furthermore, there is no complete definition that captures secure channel free PEKS schemes that are secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext attack, and against keyword guessing attacks, even though these notions seem to be the most practical application of PEKS primitives. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we define the strongest model of PEKS which is secure channel free and secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext attack, and keyword guessing attack. In particular, we present two important security notions namely IND-SCF-CKCA and IND-KGA. The former is to capture an inside adversary, while the latter is to capture an outside adversary. Intuitively, it should be clear that IND-SCF-CKCA captures a more stringent attack compared to IND-KGA. Second, we present a secure channel free PEKS scheme secure without random oracle under the well known assumptions, namely DLP, DBDH, SXDH and truncated q-ABDHE assumption. Our contributions fill the gap in the literature and hence, making the notion of PEKS Keywords without, against, random, oracle, secure, encryption, key, public, guessing, search, keyword, attacks AbstractThe notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given a "trapdoor" (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor. Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion very practical. Following Boneh et al.'s work, there have been subsequent works that have been proposed to enhance this notion. T...

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Enabling efficient and secure data sharing in cloud computing

Liu

et al. 2013

Concurrency and Computation

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SUMMARYWith the rapid development of cloud computing, more and more data are being centralized into remote cloud server for sharing, which raises a challenge on how to keep them both private and accessible. Although searchable encryption provides an efficient solution to support keyword‐based search directly on encrypted data, considering its application in file sharing, existing work depends on key sharing among authorized users, which inevitably causes the risks of key exposure and abuse. In this paper, aiming at enabling efficient and secure data sharing in cloud computing, we provide a generic construction for this purpose. The proposed construction is full‐featured: (i) It enables authorized users to perform keyword‐based search directly on encrypted data without sharing the unique secret key; and (ii) it provides two‐layered access control to limit unauthorized user's access to the shared data. On the basis of the proposed generic construction, we utilize the existing techniques on identity‐based broadcast encryption and public key searchable encryption to instantiate a concrete construction. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Recent Keyword Search Schemes over Encrypted Data

Cited by 250 publications

References 9 publications

Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Searchable Encryption with Keyword-Recoverability

Off-Line Keyword Guessing Attacks on Searchable Encryption with Keyword-Recoverability

Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle

Enabling efficient and secure data sharing in cloud computing

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