Of Political Resurrection and ‘Lost Treasures’ in Soviet and Russian Politics

Abstract

Drawing from the central notion in Russian culture of resurrection, and from Hannah Arendt's concept of political 'lost treasures', this article analyses initiatives for democratisation during the Soviet Thaw (1956-1964) and perestroika (1985-1991); and current attempts to recall the legacy of medieval Pskov and Novgorod's republican institutions. Retrieving memories of civic action matters intellectually and politically because it roots Russian democratisation in alternative national traditions, which, curiously, both Russian democratic activists and Putin supporters dismiss today. The empirical data come from interviews, ethnographic observations, and studies on Russian/Soviet politics and memory. ARE THERE 'USABLE PASTS'-SOME OF HANNAH ARENDT'S 'lost treasures'-for political reform and democratisation in Soviet and Russian history (Arendt 2006)? This article answers this question affirmatively and offers empirical evidence, which it analyses through the conceptual lens of resurrection, a central notion in Russian culture and history. Hannah Arendt's concept of 'lost treasure' provides another, more secular analytical category, which shares important commonalities with political resurrection. The first piece of empirical evidence of usable pasts is vast: it covers almost 40 years of collective and individual selftransformations from 1953 to 1991; the second comes from Russian academic research on the republican traditions of the cities of Pskov and Novgorod during the Middle Ages. In spite of its broad range, the empirical evidence has no pretence to exhaustiveness; plausibility, factuality and relevance to issues of democratisation have guided the author's choice. When this non-Russian scholar presented this argument to an audience of Russian pro-democracy activists and scholars, it understandably provoked disbelief (Guisan 2016). Indeed, selective references to the past have helped legitimise the turn of the Putin presidency to authoritarianism at home and imperialism abroad (Kalinin 2011; I would like to thank my interviewees and the many Russians who patiently answered my questions, for their very helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

The Change of the Trajectory Towards Growing Economy: The Evidence From Russia

“…When these indicators are studied over time, it is found that in Russia they have generally been low, that they improved up to the early 2000s, but that since 2004 there has been a marked deterioration in vital institutions (Oxenstierna, 2016;Bodart et al, 2012). Weak institutions create scope for manual management of economic matters, which is also a reason why institutions need to be kept weak so that political goals rather than economic goals can be pursued (Gujsan, 2018).…”