“Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy”: Hobbes's Critique of the Classical Tradition

Abstract

The early modern revolution in political philosophy not only transformed political philosophy itself; it also played a crucial role in shaping the character of modern politics. This article contributes to our understanding of that revolution through an examination of Thomas Hobbes's critique of the classical tradition. Although it is well known that Hobbes was a critic of that tradition, the details of his critique have not been sufficiently uncovered. Hobbes's key target was Aristotle, whom he regarded as the most important source of the tradition he opposed. Hobbes's critique of Aristotle consists of two main lines of argument—one moral-political, the other metaphysical—that ultimately prove to be connected. An examination of Hobbes's twofold critique can help us understand what was at stake in the reorientation of political philosophy that eventually gave rise to modern liberalism.

As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and its Contemporary Relevance

“…By discarding the concept of ‘the Good Life’ that underpinned Aristotle’s virtue friendship and by claiming that conspirators are as capable of true friendship as obedient citizens, Hobbes contributed significantly to the view that friendship may be a ‘school of virtue’ as much as a ‘school of vice’, and that it is therefore an ambivalent phenomenon – a view which some call the hallmark of modernity (Lewis, 1960: 97). Hobbes was particularly influential on our current conception of politics (Stauffer, 2016, 481), and his appraisal of friendship resonates with current thinking. Common parlance acknowledges the potential gap between the quality of the bonds of friendship and the moral character of the friends themselves: we say that close-knit companions are as thick as thieves .…”

“…It has been argued that in order to understand why Hobbes and ‘the thinkers who prepared the way for liberalism … chartered the course forward as they did, we must consider the problems they saw when they looked backward’ (Stauffer, 2016: 481), and that the best way to gain such understanding is by ‘immersion in Hobbes’s own arguments’ (482).…”