Oculomotor behavior tracks the effect of ideological priming on deception

Abstract

the burden of moral violation for people who are very much concerned in conveying a positive self-image. This interpretation is supported by previous studies showing how individuals high in social desirability are more sensitive to reputational concerns when deciding to deceive 2 and how they have a stronger inhibition of the cortical motor preparation when producing self-gain lies 12. Conclusions All in all, we demonstrate that people's moral behavior may be influenced by priming values that refer to different political ideologies. More specifically, we report that left-wing ideology activated by ideological words is effective in guiding participants' behavior during a moral decision-making task. Moreover, the analysis of the participants' oculomotor behavior reveals how priming affects moral decision making by modifying the allocation of their attention.

Reduced ownership over a virtual body modulates dishonesty

“…We did so by creating an immersive virtual reality paradigm that proved adept at manipulating the SoO toward a virtual body, whereas participants were playing a card game with other individuals. The card game was a virtual version of the TLCG ( Azevedo et al., 2017 ; Panasiti et al., 2011 , 2014 , 2016 ; Schepisi et al., 2020 ), a task where, by lying or telling the truth, participants not only determine their own gains but also the other players’. To clarify if rewards of different magnitudes can impact the hypothesized relation between SoO and (dis)honest behavior, each trial of the VR-TLCG was associated with a high or low monetary reward.…”

“…In the present study, we aimed at exploring whether reduced SoO over a virtual body could change the participants’ tendency to lie and whether this effect is modulated by the degree of negative impact the immoral decision has on others. To achieve this aim, we created a virtual reality version of the Temptation to Lie Card Game (VR-TLCG), a task where participants interact with other individuals and can freely decide whether to engage in deception or honesty ( Azevedo et al., 2017 ; Panasiti et al., 2011 , 2014 , 2016 ; Parisi et al., 2021 ; Schepisi et al., 2020 ). In this task, participants communicate the outcome of card picks performed by another person, knowing that their own and the other person’s compensations depend on what they decide to communicate (and not on actual picks).…”

Cognitive strategies for managing cheating: The roles of cognitive abilities in managing moral shortcuts

“…Importantly, the current research further explored the cognitive resources that enable executing these strategies, highlighting relations between reported levels of inhibitory and attentional abilities and strategic use of gaze aversion and hastened RT to effectively manage cheating-related conflicts. Both strategies of quick response and gaze aversion require both attention and inhibitory control (Schepisi et al, 2020), and both serve multiple functions; but the current theoretical model and findings from the regression model underscore that in the context of self-serving mistakes, quick response relies predominantly upon vigilant attention, while gaze avert relies on inhibitory control needed to enable disengagement from the target.…”

Morality in the flesh: on the link between bodily self-consciousness, morality and (dis)honest behaviour

“…However, other implicit measures of reward sensitivity suggest a different association with (im)moral behaviour. In a recent study from our group 38 we asked participants to play a game in which they were tempted to lie to people associated with different social characteristics for a monetary reward 39 . Before the (im)moral choice was made, we measured participants' tendency to look at the game outcome before the information regarding their opponent's social status.…”

“…Before the (im)moral choice was made, we measured participants' tendency to look at the game outcome before the information regarding their opponent's social status. This served as an implicit measure of reward sensitivity: the weaker this measure was, the less participants behaved immorally towards low-status opponents 38 .…”