Occupational Networking as Normative Control

Abstract

With workforce flexibility and nonstandard, "contingent," work have come new mechanisms for labor market mediation and workforce control. This study examines occupational connection and control in two groups of contract professionals. For these occupational practitioners, networking is a mechanism for labor market regulation as well as for finding work. Networking perpetuates occupational norms that demand commitment to work, accountability to clients, and reciprocity among colleagues. Adhering to occupational norms, contractors develop reputations that can enhance the likelihood of referrals from colleagues for contract assignments. Collegial exchange in an occupational labor market, therefore, exposes contractors to the informal sanctions of normative control.

Freelance Contracting in the Digital Age: Informality, Virtuality and Social Ties

“…Research on social capital has demonstrated that trusted social networks can provide individuals with information of higher quality, business referrals and some social control (Granovetter 1995;Yakubovich and Kozina 2000;Yakubovich 2005). The literature of professional contracting also stress the important role of social networks in terms of risk coping strategies (Barley and Kunda 2004;Osnowitz 2006;Antcliff, Saundry, and Stuart 2007;Apitzsch 2010). Our study investigates whether such social capital findings are relevant to freelancers contracting on the Internet.…”

“Time Is Our Commodity”

“…They overwhelmingly reported that advertising had been useless in generating business, suggesting the absence of a preexisting market. The ICEA is of little use here; although the organization attempts to help raise the profile of the industry in general, as a national and regional entity without a significant presence at the local level, it does not appear to produce new clients or particularly useful networks (Davis, Renzulli, & Aldrich, 2006;Osnowitz, 2006).…”

Professions and Their Work

“…The market shelter has thus focused the forensic field on local concerns. In the long term, however, these strong protections have worked conservatively-stifling innovation, professional consolidation, scientific knowledge, and a diversification of skill-sets, audiences, and resources-and rendered the field highly vulnerable (for similar tensions in contingency work, see Osnowitz, 2006). Structural barriers to change are also not beneficial for the state or general public because these parties receive medical knowledge increasingly focused only on criminal justice rather than a broader set of public concerns.…”

“…Yet, at the broader societal level and to various audiences, professionals made the case that their power rested on a superior scientific or technical competency. Professionals legitimate their mandate with the expectation to adhere to self-defined standards of practice (Osnowitz, 2006). As we know from various professional socialization studies, every profession depends on abstract knowledge that forms the core of its expertise and to be a professional implies that one applies this knowledge appropriately (Atkinson, 1984;Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1961;Fox, 1957;Light, 1979).…”

“…Such a shelter implies that professions are able to hold competitors at bay, thwart off meddling third parties, and control who qualifies based on training and skill. Rather than being controlled by external parties, professionals largely selfregulate through formal and informal mechanisms such as ethics codes, educational requirements, reference networks, and time-work standards (Arnold & Hagan, 1992;Osnowitz, 2006;Perlow, 2001). Once organized in a market shelter, professionals control both the supply and demand of workers and the services they provide; they are sheltered from competitive market forces.…”