2013
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2387096
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Occupational Licensing and Quality: Distributional and Heterogeneous Effects in the Teaching Profession

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Cited by 27 publications
(22 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
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“…Although impact on quality of service is theoretically central to arguments for occupational licensing regulation, empirical evidence suggests that this relationship is weak at best. Larsen () and Hotz and Xiao () find mild positive effects, but most studies find either no (Angrist and Guryan ; Kleiner and Kudrle ) or negative (Carroll and Gaston ; Kugler and Sauer ) effects. The absence of differences in malpractice insurance rates between licensed and unlicensed states (Kleiner ) is consistent with weak effects of licensing on quality.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although impact on quality of service is theoretically central to arguments for occupational licensing regulation, empirical evidence suggests that this relationship is weak at best. Larsen () and Hotz and Xiao () find mild positive effects, but most studies find either no (Angrist and Guryan ; Kleiner and Kudrle ) or negative (Carroll and Gaston ; Kugler and Sauer ) effects. The absence of differences in malpractice insurance rates between licensed and unlicensed states (Kleiner ) is consistent with weak effects of licensing on quality.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Over the course of the past decade or so, scholars have studied the licensing of doctors (Broscheid & Teske [2003], Kugler & Sauer [2005]), radiology technicians ( Timmons & Thornton [2008]), dentists (Kleiner & Kudrle [2000]), dental hygienists (Wanchek [2010]), teachers (Larsen[2012]), electricians (Kleiner & Park [2011]), mortgage brokers (Kleiner & Todd [2007], Shi [2012]), florists (Carpenter [2012]), manicurists (Federman, Harrington & Krynski [(2006]), cremators (Harrington & Krynski [2002]), barbers (Timmons & Thorton (2010)), and lawyers in America (Pagliero [2010(Pagliero [ , 2011) and Italy (Pellizzari & Pica [2011]). Think tanks have found licensing a perennial source of outrage and amusement: e.g., the American Enterprise Institute on tour guides and hair braiders (2011,2012), the Brookings Institution on lawyers (2012), and the Heritage Foundation on plumbers (2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the think tanks focus on the most egregious licensing laws and scholars vary in the fraction of licensing they attribute to public-interest motives and cartelization, we usually take it for granted that even cartelizing regimes raise the quality of services (Larsen [2012] and Kugler & Sauer [2005] are noteworthy exceptions). Moore's tree-expert law may not raise social welfare.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Appendix A illustrates examples from Angrist and Lang (2004), Larsen (2014), Palmer (2011), andBackus (2014).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…when no group-level unobservables are present). Larsen (2014) found that the grouped approach was significantly faster than estimating parameters in a single quantile regression. …”
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confidence: 99%