Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences

Felappi, Giulia

doi:10.1093/analys/anw064

Analysis

2016

DOI: 10.1093/analys/anw064

|View full text |Cite

Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences

Giulia Felappi

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2017

2021

Publication Types

Select...

Article3

Relationship

Self Cite1

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…2) responds. See also Speaks (2019); Speaks (2020); Reiland (forthcoming), and on the second question discussed below, Felappi (2016); Brigham (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Act‐type theories of propositions

Hodgson

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act‐type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act‐type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to offer explanations of the important properties of propositions. I present the core idea of the theory, and some developments of it. I discuss the relationship between the theory and the content–force distinction. I also present an important type of objection that has been raised to the explanations offered by the act‐type theory.

show abstract

“…2) responds. See also Speaks (2019); Speaks (2020); Reiland (forthcoming), and on the second question discussed below, Felappi (2016); Brigham (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Act‐type theories of propositions

Hodgson

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Face-Value Theory, Know-that, Know-wh and Know-how

Felappi

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For sentences such as (1) Columbus knows that the sea is unpredictable there is a face‐value theory, according to which ‘that’‐clauses are singular terms denoting propositions. Famously, Prior raised an objection to the theory, but defenders of the face‐value theory such as Forbes, King, Künne, Pietroski and Stanley urged that the objection could be met by maintaining that in (1) ‘to know’ designates a complex relation along the lines of being in a state of knowledge having as content. Is the theory safe, then? The aim of this paper is to show that a new problem for the theory arises if we consider some clauses other than ‘that’‐clauses.

show abstract

Analysing attitudes: How cognitive realists meet Felappi’s challenge to propositionalism

Brigham¹

2017

Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

Act‐type theories of propositions

Act‐type theories of propositions

The Face-Value Theory, Know-that, Know-wh and Know-how

Analysing attitudes: How cognitive realists meet Felappi’s challenge to propositionalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About