Objectivist conditions for defeat and evolutionary debunking arguments

Abstract

I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account.

Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence

“…However, the question of how to best spell out the view is beyond the scope of this paper. For further discussion of these issues see Klenk (2019). evidence can defeat, by contrast, are inclined to think that the objective fact that a subject's first-order evidence evidentially supports a certain claim, perhaps (but not necessarily) by logically implying it, may give her reason to accept the claim even if her background beliefs suggests that the claim does not obtain such support.…”

Explaining Higher-order Defeat

“…But the distinction that matters most for our purposes is the one between objective and subjective undercutting defeaters (Klenk, 2019). An objective undercutting defeater is evidence or some other consideration that makes one's belief about p fail to be rational.…”

“…For instance, in controversial areas of disagreement like morality, politics, and economy, it is seems likely that people are reluctant to give up their cherished beliefs despite ample evidence of disagreement as a result it seems that one could easily fail to believe that one's belief about p fails to be rational, even if one has sufficiently strong higher-order evidence to indicate that this is the case. 17 However, the Subjective Higher-order Defeat Explanation face some problems of its own (Klenk, 2019). First, it might be objected that believing that one's belief about p fails to be rational (in response to higher-order evidence about p) cannot be necessary for higher-order defeat.…”

Modal Security

“…Michael Bergmann (2006, 263-268) explicitly defends this view, and it is also implied by Scott Sturgeon's (2014, 216) analysis of an example. (For discussion, see Casullo (2018) and Klenk (2019)). If this view is correct, then the mere fact that Morris thinks that Joyce's book defeats his beliefs guarantees that it does.…”