Objective consequentialism and the licensing dilemma

Andrić, Vuko

doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9781-7

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Nevertheless, there is still a case for a rule against believing without sufficient evidence, where ‘evidence’ is interpreted liberally to encompass anything that can be used to help to establish the truth of a proposition, including observation, testimony, empirical evidence, logical proofs, and so on. The case for the rule is based on prospectivism (Zimmerman 2014) or subjectivism (Andric 2011), the view that we should do what is best given the evidence we possess. The term ‘prospectivism’ will be used here.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clifford's Consequentialism

Zamulinski

2022

Utilitas

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It is morally negligent or reckless to believe without sufficient evidence. The foregoing proposition follows from a rule that is a modified expression of W. K. Clifford's ethics of belief. Clifford attempted to prove that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence by advancing a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument. Contrary to various commentators, his argument is neither purely nor primarily epistemic, he is not a non-consequentialist, and he does not use stoicism to make his case. Clifford's conclusion is a universal generalisation that is in a precarious position because of potential counterexamples. But the counterexamples do not preclude a rule against going beyond the available evidence and it is worthwhile making a moral case for such a rule.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clifford's Consequentialism

Zamulinski

2022

Utilitas

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“…I will show that this assumption is very hard to square with our intuitions since there are various cases in which the same considerations clearly directly affect what one morally ought to do. This gives us reason to consider alternative ways of accounting 1 Philosophers who explicitly credit Jackson's case as being the strongest available argument for non-objectivism include Andrić (2013), Graham (2010), Kiesewetter (2011Kiesewetter ( , 2018, Mason (2013) and Zimmerman (2008Zimmerman ( , 2014.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing

Bruno

2022

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.

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“…This kind of worry presupposes that the rationality of a response can differ from its correctness; cf., for example, Broome (). But I am sympathetic to a reason‐response conception of rationality, according to which rationality consists in correctly responding to reasons, and, corresponding to this, to an evidence‐relative conception of reasons, according to which a consideration is a reason for a person only if it is epistemically available to that person, see Kiesewetter () for a defense of both views and Andrić (, ) for additional arguments in favor of the evidence‐relative conception of practical reasons.…”

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confidence: 99%

Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection

Andrić

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an evaluative concept. Based on this distinction, I attempt to show that Hedonists should accept that things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, are desirable for their own sakes but deny that these things are intrinsically good [Corrections added on 3 May 2019 after first online publication: The original abstract text is now the first paragraph of the paper's introduction. An updated abstract has been added.]

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Objective consequentialism and the licensing dilemma

Cited by 10 publications

References 10 publications

Clifford's Consequentialism

Clifford's Consequentialism

Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing

Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection

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