Number Marking and (in)Definiteness in Kind Terms

Abstract

ABSTRACT. This paper explores the link between number marking and (in)definiteness in nominals and their interpretation. Differences between bare singulars and plurals in languages without determiners are explained by treating bare nominals as kind terms. Differences arise, it is argued, because singular and plural kinds relate differently to their instantiations. In languages with determiners, singular kinds typically occur with the definite determiner, but plural/mass kinds can be bare in some languages and definite in others. An account of singular kinds in terms of taxonomic readings is proposed, with number marking playing a crucial role in explaining the obligatory presence of the determiner. The variation between languages with respect to plural/mass kinds is explained by positing a universal scale of definiteness, with individual languages choosing different cut-off points for lexicalization of the definite determiner. The possibility of further cross-linguistic variation is also considered. INTRODUCTIONThere is a vast literature on the topic of kind-denoting terms that has accumulated in recent years. Although it is known that there are two types of nominals that can be used for such reference, the bare plural and the singular definite generic in English for example, research has centered mostly on the bare plural. In this paper, I focus on the role of number marking and show that taking singular as well as plural kinds into consideration I am grateful for helpful comments and discussion to

Article choice in plural generics

“…The issue of genericity and definiteness has been central to early works such as Gerstner and Krifka (1989), and more recently, Dayal (2004). The particular problem we are concerned with here has been discussed by Vergnaud and Zubizaretta (1992), Krifka et al (1995), de Swart (1996, Longobardi (1994Longobardi ( , 2001), Zamparelli (2002) We assume that existential interpretations of indefinite plurals, whether bare or not, exemplified in (3), involve ordinary plural indefinites, bound by an external existential quantifier.…”

Bare NPs: Kind-referring, Indefinites, Both, or Neither?

“…Following the observation of Dayal (2002) cited in (19) , there might be additional meaning components that come with bare singulars, in particular uniqueness pre suppositions with respect to a given situation. This would not be too surprising, as bare singulars are semantically more specific than bare plurals.…”

“…To be sure, there are theories that assume that the kinds bare NPs refer to and the kinds definite NPs refer to are different; for example, Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2002) hold that the latter have unique representations. But even then (20.a) should be interpretable, saying that the potatoes of the situation talked about rolled out of the bag.…”

“…also Dayal (2002). Definite generic NPs refer to singular kinds that pick out, for each world, a group individ ual, a special type of atomic individual.…”

“…section 3.4) . Dayal (2002) makes the interesting proposal that it can be obtained via the taxonomic interpretation of count nouns. This use of count nouns refers to kinds instead of regular objects ; an example is Th ere are two bears in Alaska, the black bear and the grizzly.…”