Nudging Climate Change Mitigation: A Laboratory Experiment with Inter-Generational Public Goods

Abstract

To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals’ behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple “nudge” interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions.

How does framing influence preference for multiple solutions to societal problems?

“…First, participants might have thought that employing more solutions is more effective when addressing a complex problem [ 46 , 47 ]. This “more is better” mindset can be further compounded by a person’s concern for a problem (i.e., more solutions feel more assuring), and the lack of resource constraints (i.e., without financial constraints it feels intuitive to employ all possible solutions), which can further encourage people to choose the multi-solution option by default [ 48 , 49 ]. Second, many participants might have preferred not to take a side in these problems, a lot of which are contentious and potentially damaging to interpersonal relationships [ 50 , 51 ].…”

International Conference Socioecos 2024

“…Additionally, reformulating the intergroup decisionmaking framework using non-economic nudges has shown efficacy. For instance, Böhm et al (2020) demonstrate that "default nudges"-altering the default level of choice-and "self-commitment nudges"-providing individuals with the opportunity to self-commit to intergenerational solidarity-are effective in altering willingness to cooperate on long-term mitigation efforts beneficial to future generations.…”

Multilevel intergroup conflict at the core of climate (in)justice: Psychological challenges and ways forward

“…Climate action also has an intergenerational dimension, with current generations being aware of the actions (or rather, inactions) of preceding generations, and future generations being at the mercy of current generations' actions (Böhm et al, 2020). Studies that have examined the impact of predecessors' choices to contribute or not to a public good like climate have identified intergenerational reciprocity as a powerful heuristic in intergenerational decisions (Bang et al, 2017; Wade‐Benzoni, 2002).…”