Nudge: Towards a Consensus View?

Abstract

This article presents a particular viewpoint on how nudge should be understood. The concept of nudge has generated considerable interest among academics and policymakers. However, ten years later, what is meant exactly by "nudge" is still a matter of debate. In fact, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the (original) narrow definition of Thaler and Sunstein (nudge in the narrow sense, NN) and the (later) broad definition of Sunstein (nudge in the broad sense, NB). These two definitions differ regarding the instrumental use of rationality failures, and accordingly whether the provision or disclosure of information counts as a nudge or not. From a pragmatic perspective, the paper argues for a position that consists of adopting the broad definition of a nudge while acknowledging several types of nudges, which we provide in an integrative view. We suggest that future research should assess the effectiveness of these different types of nudges separately.

A review of nudges: Definitions, justifications, effectiveness

“…Private or public initiatives that steer people in particular directions but that also allow them to go their own way (Sunstein, 2018, p. 61, emphasis added). Berthet and Ouvrard (2019) refer to this definition as a nudge in the "broad sense," opposed to the "narrow sense" of the definition by Hansen (2016), discussed above. In fact, this definition does not refer to the specific workings of a nudge, such as the relationship with cognitive biases, thereby also including in the family of nudges interventions that appear wholly compatible with neoclassical rationality.…”

Algorithmic Nudging: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Oversight

“…Since this description does not mention economic incentives, interventions that mix economic incentives with more subtle psychological techniques, for example, a small tax on the use of plastic bags at a supermarket, can presumably still count as nudges. However, since Hansen's definition stresses the rationality failures in human judgement, it can be thought of as a narrower definition of nudge than Thaler and Sunstein's (Berthet and Ouvrard 2019). An educational campaign that informs people about the risks of contracting sexually transmitted diseases in order to promote the use of contraceptives could be classed as nudge according to Thaler and Sunstein, but not Hansen.…”

Combining behavioural and reflective policy tools for the environment: a scoping review of behavioural public policy literature

“…In a diverse and dynamically changing field such as BPP, there is no overall consensus on definitions of key terms and choices require careful consideration (e.g. Berthet and Ouvrard 2019).…”

“…Reflective tools, in turn, are geared to provoke individual and collective reflectionthe functions of the brain that are referred to as System 2 (Kahneman 2011). This distinction is based on the mechanism by which policy tools work, not the end goal of an intervention such as changing behaviour or changing beliefs and attitudes (see Berthet and Ouvrard 2019). Nevertheless, our typology is imperfect in practice.…”

“…Nevertheless, our typology is imperfect in practice. For instance, providing social information may be aimed at stimulating reflection and deliberation by an individual (System 2), but may provide a heuristic rule for people to follow others' actions (a social compliance heuristic) (Berthet and Ouvrard 2019). Similarly, displaying warning signs on cigarette packaging may target a strong and automatic emotional response (System 1), but may also result in engaging reflection and attitudinal change as a result thereof (System 2).…”