Nudging, or the subtle design of the context of choice in a way that mobilizes the unconscious mind and alters human behavior predictably (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), has come under severe criticism for entailing numerous practical and ethical problems. A critical reading of nudging and its critics indicates that the polarization of views stems from theoretical underpinnings that can be questioned on both sides of the debate in light of recent developments in social and cognitive sciences. These developments reflect an intellectual shift away from a purely rationalistic conception of human being toward conceptions that incorporate the unconscious intuitive processes of the mind. Embracing the intellectual shift, I argue, inspires an approach to nudging that bypasses the dichotomy between conscious and unconscious processes of the mind, and embraces an integrative view. More specifically, I will argue that environmental governance researchers have a responsibility to consider nudging in their work, because the unconscious mental processes that underlie nudging are writ large in the governance of common pool resources. Nudging departs from the behavioral assumptions underlying contemporary environmental policy instruments. Nudging is based on the so-called dual model of cognition. The model distinguishes between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic and unconscious (type 1 processes) and those that are slow, deliberative and conscious (type 2 processes). A glance at today's predominant environmental policy instruments indicates that they rely largely on type 2 cognitive processes. Command-and-control, economic, and voluntary instruments assume that human beings are rational optimizers capable of weighing risks and benefits.