Nuclear Weapons in the Taiwan Strait Part I

Abstract

During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which began in the fall of 1954 and ended in the fall of 1958, US President Dwight Eisenhower prepared to attack the People's Republic of China (PRC) with nuclear weapons to protect the government of Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. This new examination of the crisis, which includes consideration of documentation from PRC and Soviet archives, demonstrates US threats to attack the PRC with nuclear weapons were not necessary to deter military escalation and were not effective in deterring PRC leaders from pursuing their objectives. Instead of dividing these events into a first and second crisis, this study ties together the earlier and later periods of military activity with the US-PRC negotiations that took place in between. Including the negotiations reveals the greatest danger of US nuclear use was in the spring of 1955 before Eisenhower understood the cause of the crisis. It also demonstrates it was Eisenhower's willingness to negotiate with the PRC, and not US preparations for nuclear use, which he withdrew during the second period of military activity in 1958, that allowed Eisenhower to avoid military escalation and resolve the crisis.

Nuclear learning and US–China strategic stability in Asia

“…This misalignment of perceptions, interests, and resolve could easily result in military conflicts between the US and China, and pressures for preemptive actions (including the use of nuclear weapons) against each other's military assets in the region and in coastal areas to gain the upper hand. Escalatory risks also abound in submarine warfare, mining, and Chinese blockade of the Taiwan Strait, followed by US countermeasures from anti-submarine warfare taking out of Chinese command and control structures and conventional/nuclear missile sites (Kulacki 2020).…”