Nuclear Proliferation Deterrence: Bullying vs Diplomacy

Abstract

The article examines the plausibility of using sanctions as an instrument that can deter nuclear proliferation. Sanctions have been a favored policy tool in the arsenal of the international community, when it comes to issues relating to deterring nuclear proliferation. The adoptions of sanctions as a policy instrument that can quench the nuclear ambition of states and/or regimes are based on two main assumptions. First, it is believed that they add cost to the regime aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons, by limiting the regime’s access to finance and thus discourage it from furthering its nuclear ambition. Second, it is believed that the impact of sanctions on the welfare and well-being of the citizens of a targeted regime will prompt the citizens to rebel against the regime and perhaps force it to comply with the demands of the sanctions imposing party. This article however, took a dissimilar view and argues that sanctions as a single policy tool cannot check nuclear proliferation. At best they can be used to express discontent or signal displeasure to a regime with nuclear ambition. The article concludes that diplomacy devoid of rapacity is and will remain the plausible mechanism to deter nuclear proliferation.

Solar Radiation Modification ‐ A “Silver Bullet” Climate Policy for Populist and Authoritarian Regimes?

“…This requires also that coalition partners are clear on their own national interests and preference regarding various SRM deployment scenarios as the risk of defecting is greater the more a coalition member might suspect that ongoing SRM deployment is in its own interest. The history of sanctions in the context of nuclear non‐proliferation has shown that they have been able to prevent open use of nuclear weapons but not the build up of nuclear weapon capacity (Ogbonna, 2017).…”

“…This requires also that coalition partners are clear on their own national interests and preference regarding various SRM deployment scenarios as the risk of defecting is greater the more a coalition member might suspect that ongoing SRM deployment is in its own interest. The history of sanctions in the context of nuclear non-proliferation has shown that they have been able to prevent open use of nuclear weapons but not the build up of nuclear weapon capacity (Ogbonna, 2017). Horton et al (2015) raise the possibility to invoke liability; this however again builds on the assumption that a state will accept international legal procedures which is unlikely for either a populist or an authoritarian state (Horton et al, 2015 on p. 267 explicitly state that enforcement would involve the 'exercise of power, the pursuit of interest, or the influence of institutions').…”