Nuclear denial: From Hiroshima to Fukushima

Abstract

Governments and the nuclear power industry have a strong interest in playing down the harmful effects of radiation from atomic weapons and nuclear power plants. Over the years, some scientists have supported the view that low levels of radiation are not harmful, while other scientists have held that all radiation is harmful. The author examines the radiation effects of nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945; nuclear weapons testing; plutonium plant accidents at Windscale in England and Chelyabinsk in the Soviet Union; nuclear power plant emissions during normal operations; and the power plant accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States, Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, and Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. In each case, he finds a pattern of minimizing the damage to humans and attributing evidence of shortened life spans mostly to stress and social dislocation rather than to radiation. While low-level radiation is now generally accepted as harmful, its effects are deemed to be so small that they cannot be distinguished from the much greater effects of stress and social dislocation. Thus, some scientists declare that there is no point in even studying the populations exposed to the radioactive elements released into the atmosphere during the 2011 accident at Fukushima.

Visual Representations of Radiation Risk and the Question of Public (Mis-)Trust in Post-Fukushima Japan

“…In addition, psychological stress and social dislocation as a consequence of the nuclear disaster also imply dangers for their health both in the short run and in the long run [50][51][52]. Perrow [53] examined the radiation effects of several nuclear incidents with regard to the interests of governments and the nuclear power industry to downplay the harmful effects of radiation. He found a pattern of minimizing the damage to humans and attributing evidence of shortened life spans mostly to stress and dislocation rather than to radiation.…”

Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima: Visions of Science, Technology, and Society

“…In this context, mothers who express concerns about the effects of low-dose radiation exposure on their young children are portrayed as irrational and pressured to be silent; uninformed workers are mobilized to participate in decontamination efforts in a precarious, exploitative manner (e.g., [20,30]); official discourses continue to deny or undermine the harmful effects of radiation (e.g., [29,38]); evacuees from some areas with decreased radiation are nudged to return, with financial support about to be reduced or cut; and municipalities within 30 km of a NPP, although now part of emergency evacuation plans, still do not have a formal say in its restarting. These are consistent with the earlier visions of nuclear technology, even though to some extent Japan's nuclear imaginaries have forever been changed by the accident.…”

Managerial and non-technical factors in the development of human-created disasters: A review and research agenda

“…Le Coze (2013) proposed two new potential models as syntheses of previous models, namely the Systemic and Dynamic Sensitizing Model of Safety (SDSMS) and Socio-Natural-Technical Systems (SNTS). An arguably more controversial sociological theory of accidents is that of Perrow (1984Perrow ( , 2007Perrow ( , 2011Perrow ( , 2013, whose 'normal accident hypothesis' stated that complex, highly coupled systems experience failure modes that are not predictable and therefore are not preventable (i.e. accidents are systemically inevitable as emergent properties of complex systems such as organizations and other human activity systems).…”

“…Mari-Vassilikos explosion (Polyviou, 2011;Waring, 2013) Cyprus 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor core meltdown and widespread radioactive contamination (NAIIC, 2012;Perrow, 2011Perrow, , 2013 Japan 2011…”

“…For example, following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Perrow (2011Perrow ( , 2013 wrote about such establishment groups being in denial about nuclear accident and harm, perhaps because it was too dreadful to contemplate, or because the notion of a nuclear accident actually occurring and people actually being harmed did not fit with conventional scientific and engineering wisdom on risk, policy positions or vested commercial interests. This somewhat polemical anti-establishment line is similar to that of the seminal book on 'risk society' by sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992), which included discussion of the Villa Parisi industrial pollution build-up in Brazil over an 18-year period, followed by the 1972 conflagration which killed over 500 people, and the Bhopal toxic release in 1987.…”