Novel H7N2 and H5N6 Avian Influenza A Viruses in Sentinel Chickens: A Sentinel Chicken Surveillance Study

Zhao, Teng; Qian, Yan-Hua; Chen, Shan-Hui; Wang, Guolin; Wu, Mengna; Huang, Yong; Ma, Guangyuan; Fang, Li‐Qun; Gray, Gregory C.; Liu, Bing; Tong, Yigang; Ma, Mai‐Juan; Cao, Wu‐Chun

doi:10.3389/fmicb.2016.01766

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Reassortment events with the involvement of A(H9N2) and several other subtypes present in the endemic regions, such as A(H5N1), A(H5N6), H7N2, H7N3, H7N6, A(H7N9) or H10N8 have been frequently described (Iqbal et al, 2009;Sun and Liu, 2015;Marinova-Petkova et al, 2016a;Tosh et al, 2016;Zhao et al, 2016;Wu et al, 2017). The A(H9N2) virus has served as both the 'donor' and the 'receiver' of internal genes.…”

Section: Genetic Characterisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

Brown¹,

Mulatti²,

Śmietanka³

et al. 2017

EFS2

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The A(H5N8) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic occurred in 29 European countries in 2016/2017 and has been the largest ever recorded in the EU in terms of number of poultry outbreaks, geographical extent and number of dead wild birds. Multiple primary incursions temporally related with all major poultry sectors affected but secondary spread was most commonly associated with domestic waterfowl species. A massive effort of all the affected EU Member States (MSs) allowed a descriptive epidemiological overview of the cases in poultry, captive birds and wild birds, providing also information on measures applied at the individual MS level. Data on poultry population structure are required to facilitate data and risk factor analysis, hence to strengthen science-based advice to risk managers. It is suggested to promote common understanding and application of definitions related to control activities and their reporting across MSs. Despite a large number of human exposures to infected poultry occurred during the ongoing outbreaks, no transmission to humans has been identified. Monitoring the avian influenza (AI) situation in other continents indicated a potential risk of long-distance spread of HPAI virus (HPAIV) A(H5N6) from Asia to wintering grounds towards Western Europe, similarly to what happened with HPAIV A(H5N8) and HPAIV A(H5N1) in previous years. Furthermore, the HPAI situation in Africa with A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) is rapidly evolving. Strengthening collaborations at National, EU and Global levels would allow close monitoring of the AI situation, ultimately helping to increase preparedness. No human case was reported in the EU due to AIVs subtypes A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) and A(H9N2). Direct transmission of these viruses to humans has only been reported in areas, mainly in Asia and Egypt, with a substantial involvement of wild bird and/or poultry populations. It is suggested to improve the collection and reporting of exposure events of people to AI. (7) of the above mentioned Decision, the concerned experts were allowed to take part in the discussions and in the drafting phase of the EFSA Scientific report on Avian influenza monitoring (Art. 31) -overview October 2016 -August 2017, and have not been allowed to be, or act as, a chairman, a vice-chairman or rapporteur of the WG.

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Section: Genetic Characterisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

Brown¹,

Mulatti²,

Śmietanka³

et al. 2017

EFS2

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“…The receptor-binding sites of HB1905 and HB1907 both contained Q226 and G228, indicating an avian α-2,3-SA receptor binding preference [ 47 , 48 ]. However, the S128P mutation in HB1907 strain HA may enhance its adaptation and infectivity in mammals [ 49 , 50 ]. There are other amino acid sites in the HA gene that are different between the two strains, and whether they affect receptor binding preference remains to be further studied.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pathogenicity and Transmissibility of Clade 2.3.4.4h H5N6 Avian Influenza Viruses in Mammals

Zhang

Zhang²,

Zhao

et al. 2022

Animals

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Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have the potential for cross-species transmission and pandemics. In recent years, clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 AIVs are prevalent in domestic poultry, posing a threat to the domestic poultry industry and public health. In this study, two strains of H5N6 AIVs were isolated from chickens in Hebei, China, in 2019: A/chicken/Hebei/HB1907/2019(H5N6) and A/chicken/Hebei/HB1905/2019(H5N6). Phylogenetic analysis showed that both viral HA genes clustered in the 2.3.4.4h clade. Receptor binding analysis showed that the HB1905 strain preferentially binds to α-2,3-linked sialic acid (SA) receptors, while the HB1907 strain preferentially binds to α-2,3- and α-2,6-linked sialic acid (SA) receptors. During early infection, the HB1907 strain is highly replicable in MDCK cells, more so than the HB1905 strain. Pathogenicity assays in mice showed that both viruses could replicate in the lungs without prior adaptation, with HB1907 being more highly pathogenic in mice than the HB1905 strain. Significantly, both the HB1905 and HB1907 strains can be transmitted through direct contact among guinea pigs, but the transmission efficiency of the HB1907 strain through contact between guinea pigs is much greater than that of the HB1905 strain. These results strengthen the need for ongoing surveillance and early warning of H5N6 AIVs in poultry.

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“…have also circulated and evolved in live poultry markets (LPMs), which are considered to be recombinant sources of AIVs in China ( 8 – 10 ). Meanwhile, highly pathogenic AIVs (HPAIVs) and low pathogenic AIVs (LPAIVs) frequently undergo reassortment with each other ( 7 – 9 , 11 – 13 ). In particular, H3 subtype AIVs can be detected in LPMs in China ( 9 ).…”

Section: Genome Announcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Novel Reassortant H3N2 Avian Influenza Virus Isolated from Domestic Ducks in Eastern China in 2016

Sun

et al. 2017

Genome Announc

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H3 subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) poses a great threat to public health, and so investigating its epidemiology is of great importance. A novel reassortant H3N2 AIV strain was isolated from a live poultry market in eastern China. The strain’s genes originated from H1N1, H3, and H7 AIVs. Thus, the genome information of the H3N2 isolate will help to investigate further the epidemiology of H3 subtype AIVs in China.

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Novel H7N2 and H5N6 Avian Influenza A Viruses in Sentinel Chickens: A Sentinel Chicken Surveillance Study

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

Pathogenicity and Transmissibility of Clade 2.3.4.4h H5N6 Avian Influenza Viruses in Mammals

Novel Reassortant H3N2 Avian Influenza Virus Isolated from Domestic Ducks in Eastern China in 2016

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