Novel control solutions for DoS attack delay mitigation in grid-connected and standalone inverters

Abstract

This paper introduces two novel control solutions, which allow localised delay compensation for grid-connected and standalone inverters. As the prediction horizon of the existing controllers are quite small as compared to large communication delays and information unavailability due to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, the proposed strategy offers a robust delay mitigation range using localized dynamics. Its design philosophy is leveraged via a prediction policy using the inner control loop dynamics. Based on different control objectives in gridconnected and standalone mode, the proposed solutions have been augmented into the control system accordingly. Finally, its robustness under various communication delay and DoS attacks have been tested.

An Overview of Cyber-Resilient Smart Inverters Based on Practical Attack Models

“…DOS attacks targeting a DER control center or DER site can be detected by implementing N-ID1 and N-ID2 based on cyber data-based methods [40], physical data-based methods [86], and hybrid methods [87], [88]. RC1 can be realized by designing a communication-free primary inverter controller.…”

“…For example, a rule-based fallback control strategy [88] is proposed to enhance the resiliency of the microgrid by managing the state of charge of an ESS in a decentralized manner during communication loss of the ESS smart inverter. To mitigate the intentionally delayed measurements and control commands targeting the secondary controller of inverter, Roig Greidanus et al [86] propose a prediction policy using the inner control loop dynamics to reconstruct a compensating signal locally. Network forensics methods (NF1 and NF2) should be developed to analyze the incidents and assess the defense methods.…”

A Review of Cyber–Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

“…These attacks may compromise a portion of the primary communication and control system. M. Greidanus et al proposed advanced controls to compensate for the impact of the security measures, e.g., increased latency [146].…”

Projections of Cyberattacks on Stability of DC Microgrids—Modeling Principles and Solution

“…This later allowed them to gain illegitimate access into their IT networks [6]. Some of the recent threats can be seen in gridtied PV inverter systems [8]- [9] and electric vehicles [10], where the attackers seized control of vital safety functions such as braking and steering in Jeep Cherokee and Tesla's model X [11]- [12]. There are many kinds of malicious attacks and infiltration techniques, including false data injection (FDI) attacks, denial of service (DoS) [13], replay attacks [14], man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [15], etc.…”