Notes on the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan

Abstract

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The Taliban and Their Machiavellian Moment

“…Suffering at the hands of communist opponents in the Vietnam War (1955–1975), the United States was obsessed with the idea of taking revenge on the Soviets for what they had done to the United States in Vietnam with their generous arms support to the North Vietnamese (Cogan, 2011; McCrisken, 2003: 27). The abduction and murder of Adolph Dubs, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, under the newly installed communist government in Kabul in February 1979 gave Carter’s administration “reason of state” to develop a covert policy to support anticommunist forces in Afghanistan (Prados, 2002: 467). According to Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, the United States actually seized “the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War” (Kalb and Kalb, 2012: 41).…”

On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’

“…Some $3 billion in aid was provided to the Mujahedin to assist their war against the Soviet Union, including approximately 1,000 shoulderfired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, hundreds of which remain unaccounted for and some of which may be in Al-Qaeda's inventory. 64 This was the largest CIA covert operation ever. With Washington's blessing, Saudi intelligence poured in another $2 billion worth of aid, and the chief of Saudi intelligence picked a man named Osama bin Laden to lead the foreign legion of Arab fighters in Afghanistan.…”