Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations

Young, Alasdair R.

doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1150316

Cited by 128 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…One of our interviewees indicated that ‘ the main driver of the tobacco market now is regulation, by far’ and that in this context a multilateral challenge by TTCs to national legislation that risked spillover to other markets, is a logical step (Author interview, May 2016). As such, our analysis provides new insights into MNE lobbying in international trade disputes over domestic regulations and complement the emerging scholarship on the political economy of international regulation and “regulatory capture” (De Bièvre et al 2014; Lawton et al 2009; Roemer-Mahler 2013; Woll and Artigas, 2007; Young 2012; Young 2016). The findings presented here also confirm earlier research (Eckhardt and de Bievre 2015), which indicates that in order to undertake transnational CPA, companies need to be facing a real and existential threat, that they need to be highly globalized, concentrated, well- organized and endowed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 62%

“…Such challenges have become increasingly common in the global economy and, despite growing scholarly attention (De Bièvre et al 2014; Lawton et al 2009; Roemer-Mahler 2013; Young 2012; Young 2016), we know surprisingly little about the effect of this shift in lobbying by economic actors. In this endeavor, we not only aim to provide insights into firm lobbying on trade issues, but also on transnational lobbying more generally.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Smoke screen? The globalization of production, transnational lobbying and the international political economy of plain tobacco packaging

Curran

Eckhardt

2017

Review of International Political Economy

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In 2012 Australia became the first country in the world to introduce plain tobacco packaging in an effort to reduce tobacco consumption. This move was vehemently opposed by the tobacco industry, which challenged it on several levels: nationally, bilaterally and multilaterally at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The political behavior of the tobacco companies in this case is puzzling both in terms of scale, operating at multiple levels at the same time and in terms of the countries mobilized in their defence. WTO litigation is typically the result of Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) lobbying their own government, but here third countries were mobilized. Lobbying in third country contexts, with the objective of accessing multilateral dispute settlement systems, has been little studied. We thus know very little about the driving factors behind such activities, how target governments are selected and what lobbying strategies are used. This paper draws on emerging research on transnational lobbying and a case study of the PP case to explore these issues in detail and, by doing so, aims to further our theoretical understanding of the political economy of international trade in the context of increasing regime complexity and globalization of production.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smoke screen? The globalization of production, transnational lobbying and the international political economy of plain tobacco packaging

Curran

Eckhardt

2017

Review of International Political Economy

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“…The nature of trade policy has become more complex over time, with the establishment of the WTO and particularly the proliferation and increasing depth/scope of PTAs and RoO and tariff levels that substantially differ by agreement (Curran and Eckhardt, ; Dür et al., ; Young, ). These developments have implications for (changes in) trade preferences of firms.…”

Section: Global Value Chains and Firm Preferences Over Pta Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Value Chains, Firm Preferences and the Design of Preferential Trade Agreements

Eckhardt

Lee

2018

Global Policy

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The conventional view in the literature is that only the largest and most productive firms in a country benefit, and hence support the signing of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), as they are able to take advantage of the key benefits such agreements offer. In this paper we argue that such firms may indeed be generally supportive of PTAs, but that their preferences often differ when it comes to the exact design of PTAs. These different preferences stem from the ways that firms have organized their value chains. We focus on one crucial issue where firms may hold different preferences, depending on the organization of their value chains: Rules of Origin (RoO). We test the plausibility of our argument through a detailed analysis of the preferences and political strategies of tobacco firms in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations.

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“…However, while most trade agreements concluded since the mid-1990s reference trade in services and many include substantive provisions, 1 Analysts have found that frequently these do little to liberalize trade (Miroudot et al, 2010;Roy, 2011). Services have also been controversial in negotiations between high-income countries: in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), civil society groups expressed strong concerns about opening public services sectors to greater foreign competition (Young, 2016). A subsequent initiative by a group of WTO members to conclude a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) in 2012 is in limbo at the time of writing, following the election of President Trump.…”

Section: Services Trade Policies and Economic Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Agreements, Regulatory Institutions and Services Liberalization

Fiorini

Hoekman

2018

Global Policy

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Many agreements to liberalize trade in services tend to be limited in scope. This is a puzzle considering the high share of services in total employment and value added and relatively high barriers to trade in services in many countries. In this paper we argue that neglected complementarities between services trade policies and domestic regulation may help to understand the limited ambition on services observed in many trade agreements. We show that the productivity effects of services trade liberalization are conditional on regulatory quality. Our findings suggest that greater effort to design trade agreements with a view to improving regulatory quality may be a necessary condition for deepening the services coverage of trade agreements and will enhance the welfare gains from services trade liberalization.

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Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations

Cited by 128 publications

References 30 publications

Smoke screen? The globalization of production, transnational lobbying and the international political economy of plain tobacco packaging

Smoke screen? The globalization of production, transnational lobbying and the international political economy of plain tobacco packaging

Global Value Chains, Firm Preferences and the Design of Preferential Trade Agreements

Trade Agreements, Regulatory Institutions and Services Liberalization

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