Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

Abstract

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees’ reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.

Pay-as-they-get-in: Attitudes towards Migrants and Pension Systems

“…Hence, when told that in 2018 the ratio between pensioners and workers was still below one, they may have thought that the financing of current pensions was not an issue. 14 To understand why the results in Table 5 are interesting, it is useful to report some information about the current status of pension systems in Italy and Spain. Italy's pension system is currently running a deficit of about 3% of the GDP per year.…”