2023
DOI: 10.1007/s10308-023-00658-w
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Not seeing eye to eye: perception of the China-EU economic relationship

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…It lacked relevant agreements on climate change, standards, or COVID-19 cooperation (Garcia-Herrero, 2020). Furthermore, many of the commitments in the CAI were not novel, but were already covered by Chinese laws (O'Reilly, 2021) Not only were the negotiations far from completion, but during the seven years that they had taken, several EU Member States had perceived flaws weaknesses in the proposals, some of which were related to their own national interests (Burnay, 2022: 685), and within the European Commission itself 'promise fatigue' on the part of the Chinese (Lai Suetyi, 2023). At the same time, China urgently desired that the CAI be ratified before 20 January 2021, before Biden became President of the USA, since a magic strategic goal of the PRC's external policy was, in the words of the resolute MEP Reihard Bütikofer, "to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU" (Bütikofer, 2022).…”
Section: Perspectives On the Suspension Of The Eu-china Comprehensive...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It lacked relevant agreements on climate change, standards, or COVID-19 cooperation (Garcia-Herrero, 2020). Furthermore, many of the commitments in the CAI were not novel, but were already covered by Chinese laws (O'Reilly, 2021) Not only were the negotiations far from completion, but during the seven years that they had taken, several EU Member States had perceived flaws weaknesses in the proposals, some of which were related to their own national interests (Burnay, 2022: 685), and within the European Commission itself 'promise fatigue' on the part of the Chinese (Lai Suetyi, 2023). At the same time, China urgently desired that the CAI be ratified before 20 January 2021, before Biden became President of the USA, since a magic strategic goal of the PRC's external policy was, in the words of the resolute MEP Reihard Bütikofer, "to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU" (Bütikofer, 2022).…”
Section: Perspectives On the Suspension Of The Eu-china Comprehensive...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It lacked relevant agreements on climate change, standards, or COVID-19 cooperation (Garcia-Herrero, 2020). Furthermore, many of the commitments in the CAI were not novel, but were already covered by Chinese laws (O'Reilly, 2021) Not only were the negotiations far from completion, but during the seven years that they had taken, several EU Member States had perceived flaws weaknesses in the proposals, some of which were related to their own national interests (Burnay, 2022: 685), and within the European Commission itself 'promise fatigue' on the part of the Chinese (Lai Suetyi, 2023). At the same time, China urgently desired that the CAI be ratified before 20 January 2021, before Biden became President of the USA, since a magic strategic goal of the PRC's external policy was, in the words of the resolute MEP Reihard Bütikofer, "to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU" (Bütikofer, 2022).…”
Section: Perspectives On the Suspension Of The Eu-china Comprehensive...mentioning
confidence: 99%