Not Induction’s Problem: Aquinas on Induction, Simple Apprehension, and Their Metaphysical Suppositions

Kostelecky, Matthew

doi:10.1515/9783110347777.301

Cited by 2 publications

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“…While the A-T view of cognition has a robust (proposed) philosophical description of the mechanics of cognition (see, e.g., Brennan 1941;Kostelecky 2014), from how sensory data is initially perceived in a phantasm to an intellectual judgment about the thing, it does not rest solely on those mechanics. Instead, there are different sorts of knowledge and different kinds of inquiry that supervene on the process that results in the conceptualization of the thing.…”

Section: Applying the A-t View To The Modification Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual Combination, Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts

Gagné

Spalding

Kostelecky

2017

Language, Cognition, and Mind

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Understanding how properties are extended to combined concepts is critical to theories of concepts. In human judgments, properties true of a noun (ducks have webbed feet) become less true when that noun is modified (baby ducks have webbed feet), while properties false of a noun (candles have teeth) become less false when that noun is modified (purple candles have teeth). These modification and inverse modification effects have been shown to be extremely robust. Gagné and Spalding (2011, 2014b;Spalding and Gagné 2015) have argued that these effects are driven by expectation of contrast. The current experiment shows that, as expected, the modification and inverse modification effects are unaffected by the normative force with which a property is predicated of the head noun, supporting the expected contrast explanation. The results are discussed with respect to an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to concepts (Spalding and Gagné 2013).

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Section: Applying the A-t View To The Modification Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual Combination, Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts

Gagné

Spalding

Kostelecky

2017

Language, Cognition, and Mind

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Opažanje i čulna spoznaja kod Tome Akvinskog

Milidrag¹

2021

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Prvi i drugi deo studije posvećni su osnovnim postavkama Tominog razumevanja čulnog opažanja, pojmovima čulnih moći, svojstvenog i zajedničkog čulnog predmeta i značenju izraza similitudo, species i intentio. Treći deo obrađuje pet spoljašnjih čula i razmatra smisao Tomine tvrdnje da pri opažanju dolazi do duhovne promene. Četvrti deo bavi se zajedničkim čulom, a peti imaginacijom i fantazmom. U šestom je analizirana mislilačka moć i tumačena je Tomina tvrdnja da ona opaža pojedinačnosti ut existens sub natura communi. Sedmi deo posvećen je pamćenju. U osmom delu obrađeni su aspekti čulne spoznaje u kojima Toma vidi prisustvo razumskog elementa, iskustvo, prva univerzalija i priprema fantazama za apstrahovanje. U završnom delu ukratko su obrađeni problemi mesta indukcije i iskustva u spoznaji prvih principa, praktični silogizam i odnos odvojene duše i čulne spoznaje.

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Not Induction’s Problem: Aquinas on Induction, Simple Apprehension, and Their Metaphysical Suppositions

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Conceptual Combination, Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts

Conceptual Combination, Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts

Opažanje i čulna spoznaja kod Tome Akvinskog

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