2018
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-018-3911-5
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Not Good, Not Bad: The Effect of Family Control on Environmental Performance Disclosure by Business Group Firms

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Cited by 51 publications
(45 citation statements)
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“…Our results indicate that family ownership of business groups does not have a significant impact on community-related CSR. In light of recent work by Terlaak, Kim and Roh (2018), we believe that family ownership within Indian business groups by itself might not be sufficient to boost CSR. Instead, a combination of family ownership and family leadership within Indian business groups might be necessary to foster community-related CSR.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…Our results indicate that family ownership of business groups does not have a significant impact on community-related CSR. In light of recent work by Terlaak, Kim and Roh (2018), we believe that family ownership within Indian business groups by itself might not be sufficient to boost CSR. Instead, a combination of family ownership and family leadership within Indian business groups might be necessary to foster community-related CSR.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…The responsibility of business to pursue environmental and social strategies has been well documented (Bansal & Hoffman, 2012; Terlaak, Kim, & Roh, 2018). Similarly, Moura‐Leite, Padgett, and Galán (2014) have posited that due to limited resources and increased demands for social welfare, businesses should be concerned with issues such as environmental damage, product safety and human resource management.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Family firms employ strategically environmental management to preserve and improve such nonfinancial objectives (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez‐Mejia, & Larraza‐Kintana, 2010; Xie, Zhu, & Wang, 2019). Existing literature has documented that family firms can achieve better environmental performance than nonfamily firms (Campopiano, De Massis, & Chirico, 2014; Terlaak, Kim, & Roh, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, family firms could cause type II agency problem that controlling families with great decision‐making power expropriate outside stakeholders, including suppliers and minority shareholders, to achieve their noneconomic objectives (Li, Wu, & Song, 2017; Masulis & Reza, 2015; Yu et al, 2019). In South Korea, family firms employ opportunistically controlling mechanism, including pyramiding and cross‐shareholding, to exert greater voting rights over cash‐flow rights on the firms (Jeong, Jeong, Lee, & Bae, 2018; Terlaak et al, 2018). Directors of boards, executives in top management teams, and managers at key positions in general also are appointed by controlling families (Luo & Chung, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%