Not doomed: sociology and psychiatry, and ignorance and expertise

Ikkos, George

doi:10.1192/bjb.2022.60

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 26 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…Without forsaking our expertise, we need to reconsider its nature and valence. 24,25 This requires engaging in meaningful ways in ongoing dialogue with the service user movement about our respective identities and ways of doing things and mutual expectations. 26 One practical way to begin immediately would be through proper attention to 'mad studies' at all stages of training and continuing professional development of psychiatrists.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

European madness 1910–1980: lessons for today from Alastair Morgan'sContinental Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Lure of Madness

Ikkos

2023

BJPsych Bull

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Summary In Continental Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Lure of Madness Alastair Morgan surveys the contributions of a loosely conceived school of psychiatrists, philosophers and social theorists to understanding and responding to madness during the years 1910–1980. Taking my cue from him, I highlight some of the contributors discussed in Morgan's book and reflect that although madness may be difficult or even impossible to articulate effectively in discourse it remains a ‘limit experience’ which demarcates and illuminates the contours of other thinking and being, including reason and activism. I discuss social and cultural factors that have dulled clinicians’ sensitivities to the sounds of madness in recent decades and advocate the need for a reappraisal of our expertise and for a new activism today. What may at first appear as a failed clinical-philosophical tradition remains of professional relevance in today's rapidly transforming circumstances of practice both as inspiration and as cautionary tale.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

European madness 1910–1980: lessons for today from Alastair Morgan'sContinental Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Lure of Madness

Ikkos

2023

BJPsych Bull

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“…Diagnostic manuals have aspired to be atheoretical and stick to the facts but, as we all know, all facts are already theory. In their attempt to disavow their theoretical presuppositions, DSM's are therefore significant professional, political and ideological documents [25]. Should we suspect that if features such as incoherence, instability, etc., of the self are deemed psychopathological phenomena (and sometimes stigmatized as such) this is a consequence (or a side effect) of their being socially and politically censored?…”

Section: Narrativity In a Historical Social And Cultural Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logics of Discovery III: What ‘Sleeps’ When We Are Dreaming? Dream Consciousness as Suspension of the ‘Will’ to Narratively Organise Our Experiences

Stanghellini

2023

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Contemporary diagnostic practice in psychiatry relies on the tick-box approach of diagnostic manuals. In light of the obvious limitations of diagnostic systems, narrative formulations, whether in the form of biological, psychodynamic or behavioural cognitive ones, have been proposed. Their approach, which can be caricatured as one of drawing arrows, enriches our clinical tools and practice but in their explicitly theoretical orientation, as well as expanding the field of discovery, they also constrain it. In two previous papers I summarized the resulting limitations, with specific reference to the patient’s experience and proposed further enriching clinical perspicacity by attending to images and parataxis. The specific intent of attending to the patient’s experiences through a process that explicitly eschews narrativization, but allows clinical phenomena to “hang loose”, is to facilitate a process of clinical discovery and healing through practices of co-production between patient and clinician. In the present paper, I expand the range of phenomena that may assist in this co-production through adding attention to dreams to that of images and parataxis. In particular, I turn to the work of the Italian novelist Guido Morselli. Morselli agrues that the self is created through bundling experiences together through acts of “will” in order to establish our personal narrative. In doing so, however, the “will” forbids access to phenomena that do not fit the dominant narrative. Experience is therefore impoverished. Dream consciousness is a type of consciousness not harnessed by the constraints of narrativity. It allows a slipping of the narrative vigilance which bundles phenomena together to create a coherent narrative and thus offers a richer menu of potential experiences, including “bizarre” images that can serve to challenge our usual self-narrative and offer a new perspective on ourselves.

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“…I would like to focus on two of George Ikkos's comments: 1 ‘Although fairness is undoubtedly a foundational value in both history and psychiatry, arguably the key driver in historical enquiry should be discovery rather than praise or blame’ and ‘Consistent with her institutional position, Hilton presses repeatedly her legitimate anxiety lest psychiatrists be unfairly criticised or blamed’.…”

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confidence: 99%