Not All Attitudes are Propositional

Abstract

Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk‐psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non‐propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non‐propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non‐propositional objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. I reach this conclusion by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently non‐propositional attitudes in terms of the propositional fail, but that some non‐propositional attitudes don't even supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken.

Character, Attitude and Disposition

“…When the object of an attitude is a proposition, which is to say it can be captured in a declarative sentence, the intentional attitude is known as a propositional attitude. Many philosophers hold that every intentional attitude is either itself a propositional attitude or comprised of propositional attitudes, though this view has recently been challenged (e.g., Crane : 112–4; Montague ; Merricks ; Grzankowski ). But irrespective of that dispute, when analytic philosophers of mind use the term ‘attitude’, they are usually referring to intentional attitudes.…”

Subjective Disagreement

“…Of course, it is debatable whether appearances are to be trusted here; at least some have argued that liking and disliking should be analyzed as relations to propositions after all. For relevant discussion, see Sinhababu ; Grzankowski , .…”

Attitudes Towards Objects

“…Thanks are due to a number of audiences at the University of Texas at Austin, to the audience at the Pacific Division meeting of the APA, and to the audience at the 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. Special thanks to Josh Dever, Hans Kamp, Mark Sainsbury, and Michael Tye for valuable feedback on earlier drafts.…”