Not a Miracle After All… Côte d'IVOIRE'S Downfall: Flawed Civil-Military Relations and Missed Opportunities

Abstract

Long touted as an island of political stability and (relative) economic prosperity in West Africa, since December 24, 1999, Côte d’Ivoire* has joined the more common category in the sub-region: praetorian states mired in political uncertainty and unending turbulence. Indeed, on September 19, 2002, it came very close to collapsing altogether, a fate very few would dare to predict only a few weeks earlier. This stunning evolution started with the military regime of General Robert Guei, which lasted less than ten months. Eric Nordlinger’s definition of praetorianism as “a situation in which military officers [in the case of Africa non-commissioned officers as well] are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force” fits Ivory Coast perfectly today. Political violence has already claimed thousands of victims. As witnessed in the recent resumption of fighting and bloody upheaval, the threat to the country and the entire sub-region has by no means disappeared - despite the Marcoussis and Accra agreements and continued efforts to end the crisis

Economic Development Strategies and Communal Violence in Africa

“…Independence was, for Houphouët-Boigny, sufficient in “nominal” terms (Woronoff, 1972, p. 53). The French aided Côte d’Ivoire’s cash crop industry by guaranteeing an export market with sufficiently high price levels, and Côte d’Ivoire minimized its defense expenditures by virtue of a 1961 defense pact that surrendered external security to the French in exchange for economic policy considerations (N’Diaye, 2005). An investment code that guaranteed the repatriation of profits for foreign companies further established Côte d’Ivoire as an investment-friendly environment for foreign firms.…”

“…Fourth, despite a preference for open markets, the Ivoirian development strategy was less one of laissez-faire economics than “state capitalism” (Woronoff, 1972, p. 204): Government cooperatives and a large public sector complemented free enterprise to create and accumulate wealth in Côte d’Ivoire. At their peak, more than 200 state enterprises operated in Côte d’Ivoire, and early challenges from workers and students were met with increased salaries, renewed price guarantees for agricultural products, scholarships, and new schools (N’Diaye, 2005).…”

“…“Ethnic arithmetic,” whereby the representation of social identity groups was formally balanced in government posts and civil service jobs, was an integral component of “Houphouëtism” (Boone, 2007). Potential political adversaries were co-opted with benefits: The armed forces were highly paid, and military and ethnic group leaders benefited from plush positions in ministries and parastatals (N’Diaye, 2005). Despite a policy that discouraged ethnic claims in favor of loyalty to the president, however, social identity groups were compartmentalized as foreign workers or national civil servants to define the distribution of patronage (Bakary, 1997).…”

To ‘midwife’ – and abort – a democracy: Mauritania's transition from military rule, 2005–2008

“…Blaise Comaporé of Burkina Faso, François Bozize of the CAR, Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia are prototypes of the syndrome. Personal transitions do not always happen smoothly, and when the military leader does not quite get it ‘right’, they can go spectacularly awry and result in political catastrophe (N'Diaye 2005), as in Cote d'Ivoire, or to a lesser extent Niger since colonel Barré Mainassara's assassination.…”