This chapter is animated by a number of empirical tensions dealing with rural well-being. These tensions have been especially well documented in the US, the focus of this chapter. Yet I know they exist, and therefore complicate rural policy, in other countries (e.g. Almås & Fuglestad, 2020;Gallent & Gkartzios, 2019). For example, the 2020 World Happiness Report tells of how rural citizens in Northern and Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand are on average more satisfied with their life compared to their urban counterparts (Burger et al., 2020). Relatedly, note the findings of the US-focused Life in Rural America survey (NPR/ Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/ Harvard University, 2018). The report explains that rural Americans are 'largely optimistic about the future, as most say the number of good jobs in their local community will either stay the same or increase in the next five years'; a majority also reported being 'better off financially compared to their parents at the same age, and a majority think their children will be better off financially compared to themselves' (p. 1).And yet, from a follow-up survey conducted a few months later -Life in Rural America Part II -nearly half of rural Americans report not being able to afford an unexpected $1,000 expense, while four in ten said their families have experienced problems paying for medical bills, housing or food in the past few years (NPR/ Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/ Harvard University, 2019, p. 1). From 1999 to 2016, the rate of suicide among Americans ages 25 to 64 rose by 41 per cent. Suicide rates among individuals in rural counties are now roughly 25 per cent higher than those in major metropolitan areas (Carroll, 2019). Much of the authoritarian populism witnessed in the US and elsewhere -Trumpism (US), Brexit (UK), the rise of Bolsonaro (Brazil) -has been attributed to deeply felt rural anxieties (e.g., Carolan, 2020aCarolan, , 2020bScoones et al., 2018).