Northeast Asia's Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory – Edited by Mikyoung Kim and Barry Schwartz

Political apologies and their acceptance: Experimental evidence from victims and perpetrators nations

“…The wrongdoings during that era had structural as well as individual features. It concerned everyone in Korea because Japan suppressed Korean surnames, imposed Shintoism, banned organizations and committed other wrongdoings, making Korea a victim nation (Buruma, 1994; Kim & Schwartz, 2010; Lee, 1985; Tatsumi, 2021). At the same time, some groups experienced individual victimization, for example, the families of those who perished in uprisings, those who were forced into labour and others became victims of sexual slavery, the so‐called ‘comfort women’ (Yoshimi, 2000).…”

“…However, the efficacy of apologies has also been questioned. Apologies do not always facilitate reconciliation among nations (Brooks, 1999; Kim & Schwartz, 2010; Kitagawa & Chu, 2021) or between groups (Brown & Pehrson, 2019; Hornsey & Wohl, 2013; Philpot & Hornsey, 2011).…”

Apology mismatch: An experimental approach to Japan's apologies to Korea

“…Since around the 1960s, Japan has tried to deal with its war past, having reached a bilateral settlement with South Korea, and issuing a number of apology statements, which sought to address historical injustices committed by Japan. Many of those “speech acts,” in Tavuchis's (1991) terms, oscillate between comprehensive measures of good intentions to more fragmented quasi‐apologies with conspicuous omissions (Hicks, 1994, 1998; Kim & Schwartz, 2010). Some of those positively tuned speech acts were undermined by outright defiance, or denial, by other Japanese representatives whether in the opposition party or a competing faction.…”

“…Some of them were undermined by Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which symbolizes the history of Japanese militarism because it enshrines war dead, including convicted war criminals. Japan has rejected many of the apology claims because based on the 1965 settlement, Korea was not supposed to raise any issues related to the past (see Bridges, 1993; Kim & Schwartz, 2010; Lee, 1985; Stan & Nedelsky, 2013; 2020). Although many historical injustices were “covered” by the 1965 “settlement,” some have remained unaddressed.…”

“…Japan rejected many apology demands from Korea because, based on the 1965 settlement, Korea was not supposed to raise any issues related to the past. However, apologies became a more pronounced feature of Japanese foreign policy in the 1980s and intensified in the following decades (see Bridges, 1993; Kim & Schwartz, 2010; Lee, 1985; Stan & Nedelsky, 2013; 2020). Many of their apology statements, however, were not accepted in Korea.…”