2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.014
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Norms in an asymmetric Public Good experiment

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Cited by 7 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation on its own or a consequence of some fairness preferences, such as “altruism,” “warm glow,” “inequity aversion,” or “reciprocity” ( Fischbacher et al, 2001 ). Experiments on conditional cooperation found that subjects usually contribute similarly to their co-players ( Keser and Winden, 2000 ; Brandts and Schram, 2004 ; Kocher et al, 2007 ; Spiller et al, 2016 ) and are willing to contribute to a PG when others also contribute or are expected to do so ( Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010 ). For example, the studies of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) on conditional cooperation indicate that individual cooperation often depends on whether a person thinks others cooperate.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation on its own or a consequence of some fairness preferences, such as “altruism,” “warm glow,” “inequity aversion,” or “reciprocity” ( Fischbacher et al, 2001 ). Experiments on conditional cooperation found that subjects usually contribute similarly to their co-players ( Keser and Winden, 2000 ; Brandts and Schram, 2004 ; Kocher et al, 2007 ; Spiller et al, 2016 ) and are willing to contribute to a PG when others also contribute or are expected to do so ( Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010 ). For example, the studies of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) on conditional cooperation indicate that individual cooperation often depends on whether a person thinks others cooperate.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, some subjects must at least know of social norms and follow them ( Elster, 1989 ; Bicchieri, 2006 ). On the other hand, participants may feel that their partners may not follow a norm even if it exists ( Reuben and Riedl, 2009 ; Spiller et al, 2016 ). In either case, the subject needs to infer from the belief of others.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…It might therefore seem that your expectations drive my behaviour; in fact, I just assume shared standards that are themselves unobservable. This is all the more problematic due to the fact that personal and second‐order normative beliefs seem to be highly correlated (Andrighetto, Grieco, and Tummolini ), and in some cases only personal norms end up being a significant influence on decisions (Spiller et al ). Surely, one will not perfectly explain the other, but the independent influence of expectations could be insignificant.…”
Section: The Shortcomings Of Incentive‐based Compliancementioning
confidence: 93%