Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.

From a Nominal to Normative Commitment: Liberating Learning Analytics from Embedded Biases Through a Sociotechnical Systems Approach

“…Doing so aligns with how philosophers of science approach such questions. Methodological normativity describes the assumptions researchers make when selecting, interpreting, evaluating, and adjusting relevant empirical information (Kaiser, 2019). Right now, methodological normativity is an incidental feature of LA, occurring if researchers focus on questions of openness and fairness and JEDI, and have access to relevant variables.…”

Masking, extrinsicness, and the nature of dispositions: the role of niche signals in muscle stem cells

“…I do not have any objection to Laplane's characterization, provided it is conceived in terms of her specific goals. But my goal in this paper is not understanding stemness to assist scientific research, but rather understanding stemness to shed light on the metaphysical question about the nature of dispositions, in the tradition of inductive metaphysics (Engelhard et al, 2021;Kaiser, 2019) or metaphysics for biology Triviño, 2022). 10 Hence, instead of taking the intrinsicness of dispositions for granted-as Laplane does-I take the dispositional nature of stemness as my starting hypothesis.…”

“…Methodologically, I follow the recent trend that aims to reinvigorate the role of potentiality in contemporary philosophy of biology (Austin & Nuño de la Rosa, 2019;Austin, 2017;Nuño de la Rosa, 2016), as well as the role of scientific practice in providing novel sources of research for traditional philosophical concepts (Engelhard et al, 2021;Guay & Pradeu, 2016;Kaiser, 2019;Triviño, 2022). My strategy will consist in relying on some contemporary research on stemness-i.e., how scientists investigate its nature-to derive philosophical conclusions about the nature of dispositions.…”

The continuity of inquiry and normative philosophy of science

“…Of course, many philosophers of science have engaged in normative work, exploring science not merely as what it is and how it proceeds but also as what it ought to be and how it ought to proceed. Some philosophy of science engages in an evaluative endeavor with the aim "to distinguish good science from bad, better scientific practices from worse" (Sober 2008, xiv), and work in this area is increasingly based on extensive descriptive analyses of scientific practice (Kaiser 2019). For example, instead of merely offering a descriptive analysis of causal and explanatory claims in the sciences, perhaps clarifying their criteria of application, some use the descriptive analysis for making normative recommendations with respect to "what one ought to mean by various causal and explanatory claims" (Woodward 2003, 7).…”