Normative Reasons for Love, Part I

Abstract

Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view and the reasons view. Along the way, I discuss the significance of falling in love, the problem of trading up, and the notion of irreplaceability. I evaluate attempts to justify love based on the intrinsic and the relational properties of the beloved.

Friendship Love and Romantic Love

“…I then sketch a socially situated account of love as an emotion that can accommodate the differences between romantic love and friendship love. I conclude by considering a commonly stated objection to emotion views of love, namely, the objection that because emotions are subject to norms of justification but love is not, love is not an emotion (e.g., Solomon 2002;Frankfurt 2004;Soble 2005;Zangwill 2013;Smuts 2014;de Sousa 2015;McKeever 2019;Pismenny 2018;Pismenny Prinz 2021). I argue that the objection is moot, as romantic love and friendship love are indeed subject to normativity constraints.…”

“…A common argument against the view that love is an emotion turns on the widely held intuition that whereas emotions are subject to standards of justification or rationality, love is reasonless and arational (Solomon 2002;Frankfurt 2004;Soble 2005;Zangwill 2013;Smuts 2014;de Sousa 2015;McKeever 2019;Pismenny Prinz 2021). As Sam Shpall (2020) notes, love on the no-reasons view is akin to non-instrumental desire on procedural (or "Humean") approaches to practical rationality.…”

Do We Love For Reasons?

“…21 The locus classicus for how reasons should be capable of explaining the things they rationalize is Williams (1981). This thought is also implicit in the objections Frankfurt (2004) raises, and is emphasized by Aaron Smuts (2013Smuts ( , 2014aSmuts ( , 2014b. 22 Still, even bracketing qualms about the relationship between normative and explanatory reasons, one might wonder whether this emphasis on coming to love makes dialectical contact with Rationalists.…”

Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love

“… 6 Zangwill, 2013, 309; cp. De Sousa, 2015, 75; Smuts, 2014a; Smuts 2014b; Frankfurt, 2006, 184; Kraut, 1987, 417; Hamlyn, 1978, 13–16; Singer, 1966, 14; Pitcher, 1965, 341–342. …”

“… 1 De Sousa, 2015, 75; Smuts, 2014a; Smuts, 2014b; Zangwill, 2013; Frankfurt, 2004; Frankfurt, 1999; Frankfurt, 1998; Singer, 1966. …”