Normative Practices of Other Animals

Animals in Moral Limbo: How Literary Pigs May Help Lab-Generated Ones

“…Engagement in "normative practice" has also been cited as evidence of animal moral status; in primates, for example, family identities, group alliances, and in-group versus out-group practices offer a "mechanism for both delineating group identities and identifying out-group individuals, much in the way language, ritual, dress, etc., serve this purpose in human cultures" [19]. For decades, primatologists have observed and written about primates exhibiting empathy, reciprocity, conflict resolution, a sense of fairness, and cooperation [19]. Marine biologists have reported cetaceans exhibiting group identities, affiliations, dominance hierarchies, and unique preferences, e.g., a subgroup of dolphins in the "Shark Bay community use sponges as foraging tools, whereas other subgroups do not" [19].…”

“…For decades, primatologists have observed and written about primates exhibiting empathy, reciprocity, conflict resolution, a sense of fairness, and cooperation [19]. Marine biologists have reported cetaceans exhibiting group identities, affiliations, dominance hierarchies, and unique preferences, e.g., a subgroup of dolphins in the "Shark Bay community use sponges as foraging tools, whereas other subgroups do not" [19].…”

“…. (and) the cognitive capacity for normative ought-thought that is foundational to normative practice and to moral psychology" [19]. Ought-thought contemplations are sophisticated cognitions required for situational moral assessment and behavior.…”

“…Ought-thought contemplations are sophisticated cognitions required for situational moral assessment and behavior. If "we remove the anthropocentric lens that has obscured some research, we can see that some claims of human uniqueness with regard to normative practiceand perhaps even the foundations of morality -may be spurious" [19].…”

Animal Norms: An Investigation of Normativity in the Non-Human Social World

“…67 This would then imply a genuinely nomic behavior, even though, as Andrews suggests, it would not presuppose either the ability to articulate this knowledge linguistically or even the necessity of language or metacognitive skills. 68 Starting from this notion, Andrews develops a theory of "naïve normativity" understood as a cognitive "ability to engage in reasoning about how others should act" 69 or "capacity for ought-thought" 70 (the ability to think normatively or deontically), which is a prerequisite of basic normative practices. Andrews considers her notion of "ingenuous normativity" to be a "cultural" version of Ginsborg's primitive normativity.…”