Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

Abstract

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005-2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a "normative power".

Migrant rescue as organized hypocrisy: EU maritime missions offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border control

“…Sometimes, as organized hypocrisy scholarship contends, these commitments may be rhetorically reiterated precisely to compensate for the lack of consistent action, thereby addressing external demands to tackle an issue without really acting upon it (Brunsson, 2007: 116;Lipson, 2007). The argument that talk and actions are often decoupled because rhetoric is used as a surrogate for the lack of consistent action may help explain the persisting disconnect between rhetoric and action in various EU policies, such as development (Hurt, 2003), the Neighbourhood Policy (Barbé and Johansson-Nogué, 2008) and armaments cooperation (Hansen and Marsh, 2015).…”

Seeking a Responsible Arms Trade to Reduce Human Suffering in Yemen

“…Despite exporting states' (including EU member states') competing national interests and views in the field of the arms trade, but also their disputably (ir-)responsible approach in this domain before the emergence of the regulatory mechanisms discussed in this article (Erickson 2015;Hansen and Marsh 2015;Duquet 2014), many of them nevertheless decided to support and adhere to "multilateral, humanitarian arms export controls" (by ratifying the ATT or, in the case of the EU, by agreeing on the standards included in the Common Position) and agreed to integrate these into their national policies. They decided to do so without any perspective of 'material gain' and in spite of the high costs that these instruments, regardless of the limitations outlined above, may still entail in terms of public scrutiny at the international and domestic level, and limitation of sovereignty (Erickson 2015).…”

“…Finally, Erickson questions whether the ATT, although lacking an enforcement mechanism, could still trigger a "behavioural change" in its states parties. She notes that this was not the case for the EU arms export control regime, which embodied the limited ability of the EU to facilitate the harmonised diffusion of these particular norms from the supranational to the national level and ultimately challenged its role as a normative power (Erickson 2011, 210-3;Hansen and Marsh 2015). However, Erickson also concludes that the legally binding nature of the ATT under international law may potentially provide courts with the formal power to "enforce its provisions", meaning that "ensuring compliance will have to rely on NGOs" (Erickson 2015).…”

Normative Power Europe? The EU's Embrace of the Responsibility to Protect in a Transitional International Order

“…In turn, NPE is challenged by a changing international order and a global push back against liberal internationalism. Nevertheless, NPE continues to attract considerable attention as a concept, with scholars exploring its theoretical value as well as applying itoften criticallyto the EU's international engagement in various policy areas (Del Sarto 2016;Gordon and Pardo 2015;Hansen and Marsh 2015;Manners 2015;Veebel and Markus, 2018).…”