Normality as a Biological Concept

Wachbroit, Robert

doi:10.1086/289823

Cited by 65 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Can such descriptive interpretation abandon statistical semantics of normality statements? This is what Wachbroit (1994) claims.…”

Section: Evolution Life and Normalitymentioning

confidence: 57%

Normality and Majority: Towards a Statistical Understanding of Normality Statements

Strößner

2014

Erkenn

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Normality judgements are frequently used in everyday communication as well as in biological and social science. Moreover they became increasingly relevant to formal logic as part of defeasible reasoning. This paper distinguishes different kinds of normality statements. It is argued that normality laws like ''Birds can normally fly'' should be understood essentially in a statistical way. The argument has basically two parts: firstly, a statistical semantic core is mandatory for a descriptive reading of normality in order to explain the logical features of normality laws. Secondly, a statistical justification of normality statements can be derived by game theoretic considerations if the normality law is understood as communication convention.

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“…Can such descriptive interpretation abandon statistical semantics of normality statements? This is what Wachbroit (1994) claims.…”

Section: Evolution Life and Normalitymentioning

confidence: 57%

Normality and Majority: Towards a Statistical Understanding of Normality Statements

Strößner

2014

Erkenn

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“…We would either have to understand normality as some kind of ideal that is hardly ever achieved in reality, or we would have to make use of statistical normality, which faces the problem of having to account for intraspecific variations that are not considered diseases. Both options have objectionable consequences, and therefore it can be stated that a theory of health as functional normality is deficient as a general theory of health (Wachbroit 1994;Ereshefsky 2009). Other research bodies, most importantly the World Health Organization, suggest a completely different understanding of health, namely as a state of complete well-being, encompassing a physical, psychological and social dimension.…”

Section: What Is Health?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Health, justice and happiness during childhood

Hernandez¹,

Graf

Schweiger³

2014

South African Journal of Philosophy

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“…Would it be good if our species helped other species but at significant cost to many individuals? Environmentalists are bitterly divided over such questions [74,80]. But even if one could convincingly argue for a metric that would allow us to compare different ways our species might affect individuals, other species, ecosystems, and the biosphere, difficult empirical questions would probably reappear.…”

Section: An Argument From the Value Of Our Species' Role In Ecosystemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

Hassoun

2008

Nanoethics

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Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnologybased human enhancements are impermissible.

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Normality as a Biological Concept

Cited by 65 publications

References 11 publications

Normality and Majority: Towards a Statistical Understanding of Normality Statements

Normality and Majority: Towards a Statistical Understanding of Normality Statements

Health, justice and happiness during childhood

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

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